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1RESCUE THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT FROM RESTRICTIVE 
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We alcoholics are men and women who have lost the ability to control our drinking.  We know that no real 
alcoholic ever recovers control.  All of us felt at times that we were regaining control, but such intervals-- 
usually brief—were inevitably followed by still less control, which led in time to pitiful and 
incomprehensible demoralization.  We are convinced to a man that alcoholics of our type are in the grip of 
a progressive illness.  Over any considerable period we get worse, never better.  We are like men who have 
lost their legs; they will never grow new ones.  ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS1
I.  Introduction 
 
The Supreme Court has narrowed the doorway into the protected class for the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)2 in virtually every employment case.3 Taking 
their cue from the Supreme Court, the lower courts have been concerned principally with 
who is “disabled” and thus protected by the ADA.4 The answer today is, not many.5 The 
courts generally have been so hostile to ADA plaintiffs that it is difficult now to find a 
case in which the plaintiff was able to prove that he was disabled.6
Congress contemplated that some impairments would always be disabling.7 The 
Supreme Court, however, has so narrowly construed the term “significantly limited in a 
major life activity,” which defines the protected class, that many impairments formerly 
considered to be inevitably disabling, such as alcoholism, are no longer protected by the 
ADA.8 Congress referred to alcoholism many times in the legislative history,9 and 
included a specific reference to alcoholism in the statute.10 For this reason, and because 
alcoholics tend to be discriminated against because they are not perceived to have a “real 
illness,”11 I have chosen alcoholism to illustrate the extreme difficulty of proving a 
disability under the current caselaw.   
2The ADA was enacted to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate 
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”12 Today that 
mandate is not being fulfilled, especially in the employment area.13 The ADA was 
modeled on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Rehabilitation Act).14 Although the ADA 
specifically provides that it should not be construed to apply a lesser standard than that 
applied under the Rehabilitation Act,15 employees who sought protection under that Act 
before the ADA was adopted did not have the problems proving that they were disabled 
that employees are having today under the ADA.16 In almost every case involving Title 
I, the part of the ADA that applies to employment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
ADA so restrictively that one would have to be so impaired that he would generally be 
unable to work at all.17 When the Court has dealt with non-employment cases, it has 
been much more generous, however.18 
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified person with disabilities.19 
To be classified as disabled, a person must 1)  have an impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities; or 2)  have a record of such an impairment; or 3)  
be regarded as having such an impairment.20 Major life activities include such things as 
seeing, hearing, and taking care of oneself.21 In addition to proving a disability, under 
Title I, the person must be “qualified,” which means that he must be able to perform 
essential job duties of the position with or without reasonable accommodation.22 
At first blush, it would seem that the ADA itself set up a “catch-22” for 
employees to qualify for the protected class, by requiring that they be substantially 
limited in the major life activity, but still able to perform the essential duties of the job.23 
However, it is the courts that have recently created the dilemma by requiring an 
3employee to be so substantially limited in a major life activity that he will generally be 
precluded from being able to perform the job.24 The class of disabled people today is 
limited virtually to people who are completely blind, deaf or in a wheelchair because they 
are totally limited in a major life activity.  Many of them cannot work at all.  People with 
less obvious impairments, such as alcoholism, diabetes, back injuries, and mental illness, 
who can work, usually are not determined to be sufficiently limited in a major life 
activity under the Court’s narrow interpretations.  Because Congress spent considerable 
time discussing protecting persons with such impairments, it is clear that the ADA was 
not intended to be restricted to impairments that are totally limiting.25 Congress was 
particularly concerned about “stereotypic assumptions” that created myths and fears 
about disabled people.26 
Alcoholism is a disability about which stereotypic assumptions are particularly 
problematic.  Alcoholics especially suffer from the “systematic prejudice, stereotypes, 
and neglect” that were the central concerns of the ADA.27 They are more likely to be 
discriminated against because they are often not perceived to be suffering from a “real” 
illness.  Alcoholics have also historically been subjected to ridicule and contempt.   
Throughout most of recorded history, excessive use of ALCOHOL was 
viewed as a willful act leading to intoxication and other sinful behaviors.  
The Bible warns against drunkenness; Islam bans alcohol use entirely.  
Since the early nineteenth century, the moral perspective has competed 
with a conceptualization of excessive use of alcohol as a disease or 
disorder, not necessarily a moral failing.28 
Congress obviously assumed that alcoholics would be protected by the ADA 
because the Act provides that an alcoholic must be able to comply with all employment 
requirements.29 Nevertheless, under current caselaw, it is difficult to imagine how an 
4alcoholic could be determined to be disabled and yet still be employable.  If an alcoholic 
is in recovery, his impairment is not significantly affecting any major life activity, under 
the Court’s strict interpretations of those terms.30 Surely, the ADA did not intend that 
recovering addicts and alcoholics, as well as other people with impairments who are 
striving to overcome their limitations, such as diabetics,31 should not receive the benefit 
of reasonable accommodations that would allow them to work.32 With regard to 
alcoholism, as with most other impairments today, if the plaintiff is able to prove that he 
is disabled, he generally would be so impaired that he would be unable to perform the 
essential functions of the job.  In other words, he would be too impaired to work.33 
A recovering alcoholic or an active alcoholic whose work performance is not 
affected could argue that he was “perceived as being disabled” or “has a record of 
disability,” as alternative paths to meeting the requirement of having a disability for the 
purposes of the ADA.34 Although the courts’ interpretations likewise make these 
avenues unlikely,35 if an alcoholic plaintiff were to succeed at this point, under neither 
path would he likely be entitled to a reasonable accommodation.36 
At the present time, most employers believe that they must accommodate an 
alcoholic and give him leave to go to treatment.37 However, as this article illustrates, 
courts are not protecting alcoholics under the ADA, which will eventually lead to 
employers’ refusing the accommodation that has saved countless people from becoming 
totally disabled by this debilitating illness, that is, leave to go to treatment.  The threat of 
losing one’s job is a powerful incentive to get sober, and this will no longer be 
available.38 
5Obviously, the ADA is asking the wrong question for alcoholism and other 
similar impairments, such as diabetes and high blood pressure that without proper 
management are inevitably disabling.  With proper treatment and management, under the 
courts’ restrictive interpretations, such impairments are not disabling.  The question 
should be, how do we enable such impaired employees to keep working?  Congress 
clearly intended in enacting the ADA to enable disabled people to work.39 The courts 
have disconnected the ADA from its intent by construing the protected class so narrowly 
that people who are managing their illnesses, and who may need the smallest 
accommodations to do so, are excluded.  Inevitably when it becomes common knowledge 
that alcoholics are not protected by the ADA, they will simply be fired when they need to 
go treatment.   
This result is even more likely because, as one author has pointed out, 
discrimination against the disabled is rational, that is, it may in fact cost the employer 
more in time, money and trouble to employ the disabled; whereas other types of 
discrimination, such as race and sex discrimination, are irrational forms of discrimination 
and cost the employer nothing to avoid.40 Another author has opined that critics of the 
ADA view it as “in effect work[ing] as a subsidy paid by employers through ‘reasonable 
accommodation,’ a subsidy likely to be borne disparately within the labor market.”41 
This author points out that this view does not take into account that disability 
discrimination costs the U.S. billions of dollars and that there are other hidden benefits to 
employing the disabled.42 
This article will examine the disease of alcoholism generally in Section II; the 
ADA generally in Section III; Supreme Court cases interpreting the ADA and the lower 
6court cases concerning alcoholism and the ADA in Section IV.  These sections will show 
that judicial interpretations have virtually eliminated alcoholism as a disability, contrary 
to obvious Congressional intent.  While this phenomenon is not limited to alcoholism, it 
is a useful illustration of the damage judicial activism has caused in this area.   
Section V. will analyze and propose a solution that can be accomplished without a 
change in the legislation.  Requiring the plaintiff to prove that he has an impairment that 
significantly limits a major life activity has become an obstacle for most plaintiffs, but 
there are two alternatives to entry into the protected class of disabled persons, being 
regarded as disabled or having a record of a disability.  These provisions should be 
interpreted more generously to prevent people from being discriminated against because 
of perceived disabilities.  People who are regarded as disabled or who have a record of a 
disability are people who can work, but who are being discriminated against because the 
employer thinks they cannot do the job.  Congress was very clear that this was the type of 
discrimination that was intended to be most protected.43 
Section VI. concludes that once employers discover that their employees with 
impairments such as alcoholism are no longer protected by the ADA, such employees 
may be terminated with impunity.  The cost of this eventuality is high in economic, as 
well as human, terms.  
II.  Alcoholism generally 
“Alcoholism is a primary chronic disease with genetic, psychosocial, and 
environmental factors influencing its development and manifestations.  The disease is 
progressive and is often fatal.  It is characterized by impaired control over drinking, 
preoccupation with the drug alcohol, use of alcohol despite adverse consequences, and 
7distortions in thinking, mostly denial.  Each of these symptoms may be continuous or 
periodic.”44 There is no cure, and the only known treatment includes complete 
abstinence.45 Alcoholics remain so, whether drinking or not; thus, alcoholics are in either 
active addiction or in recovery for life.46 The rehabilitation process, whether inpatient or 
outpatient, requires two to four weeks of intensive treatment, followed by three to six 
months of outpatient care.47 In order to prevent relapse after rehabilitation, most 
alcoholics, especially those in early recovery, require frequent attendance at meetings of 
Alcoholics Anonymous and/or counseling.48 Even then, relapse is not uncommon and 
must be considered part of the syndrome.49 
The principal societal belief is that alcoholics have caused their own impairment.  
While this can be said of many impairments,50 such as diabetes and heart disease, society 
particularly frowns on alcoholics.51 Because there is a genetic component to alcoholism 
that has yet to be fully understood,52 the idea that alcoholics are responsible for their own 
impairment must be questioned.  Because alcoholics probably have a predisposition to 
the disease, the only way to avoid its manifestation is to never take the first drink.  
Because ninety percent of the population of Western countries drink alcohol at some time 
in their lives,53 generally beginning in their early to mid-teens, alcohol consumption is 
“an almost ubiquitous phenomenon” in Western society.54 Society is blaming the victim 
in the case of alcoholics, who are simply conforming to the norm in their original 
consumption of alcohol.55 Thus, the stereotypical view of alcoholism as a volitional 
condition is most likely false. 
The stereotypical alcoholic street person is also a false stereotype.56 Alcoholics 
usually have jobs and function moderately well in family settings.57 Because they are 
8able to work, recovering alcoholics generally may need three types of accommodations.  
The first is a leave of absence to attend residential treatment.  The second is some 
accommodation that allows the employee to attend AA meetings and/or counseling 
sessions.58 I would also venture to suggest a third accommodation, and that is, a second 
chance if the alcoholic relapses.  Because relapse is part of the syndrome,59 alcoholics 
should be given at least one second chance.  The line has to be drawn, however, between 
second chances and multiple chances, which may enable the alcoholic to continue to 
drink. 
Congress expressly referred to alcoholism in the ADA.60 The cases under the 
Rehabilitation Act recognized alcoholism as a per se disability, and the early ADA cases 
followed suit.61 Recent cases have uniformly rejected the contention that alcoholism is 
disabling, however, leaving alcoholism unprotected by the ADA.  To understand how this 
has evolved, I will turn to an explanation of the ADA generally, followed by the pertinent 
cases. 
III.  The ADA 
A.  Statutory provisions. 
 The ADA is a comprehensive act to protect people with disabilities from 
discrimination in public services, accommodations and telecommunications, as well as 
employment.62 Title I applies to employment discrimination.63 The ADA essentially 
follows the law developed under the Rehabilitation Act of 1963,64 which applied to 
federal contractors, the federal government and federal grantees,65 as well as the law66 
developed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.67 The ADA’s substantive 
provisions are a combination of those statutory provisions as well.68 
9The coverage is the same as Title VII, that is, the ADA applies to employers with 
more than fifteen employees.69 The protected class consists of any "qualified individual 
with a disability" who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the job.70 Disability means a physical or mental impairment which 
substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities, a record of 
impairment or being regarded as having such an impairment.71 
Many of the provisions of the ADA were taken from Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964;72 however, the discrimination provisions of the ADA are much more 
specific.  The ADA provides, analogously to Title VII, that the employer may not 
discriminate against qualified persons with disabilities on the basis of disability in job 
application procedures, hiring, advancement, compensation, training and other terms or 
conditions of employment.73 The ADA adds specific provisions that prohibit employers 
from asking questions regarding disabilities in pre-employment procedures74 and limit the 
employer’s ability to require pre-employment physicals,75 except for drug tests.76 
The ADA also includes a provision identical to the provision of Title VII that is 
the basis for disparate impact,77 which forbids practices that limit opportunities for the 
disabled.78 In addition, the ADA has language that more expressly codifies the disparate 
impact theory by forbidding practices that screen out or tend to screen out people with 
disabilities and practices that have the effect of discriminating, unless they are shown to 
be justified by business necessity.79 
Defenses to an ADA claim include allowing the employer to demonstrate that any 
selection criterion that screens out “an individual with a disability has been shown to be 
job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be 
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accomplished by reasonable accommodation.”80 Although the requirement for 
reasonable accommodation which does not amount to an undue hardship mirrors the Title 
VII requirement for religious accommodation,81 the ADA provides that undue hardship is 
not to be defined with reference to Title VII.82 The ADA does not define reasonable 
accommodation but rather lists possibilities such as: redesigning facilities to make them 
accessible; restructuring the work environment, requirements, assignments, schedules, 
and equipment; and providing readers or interpreters.83 While reasonable 
accommodation is not specifically defined in the act, the examples given of reasonable 
accommodations make it clear that a reasonable accommodation can be fairly 
burdensome.84 
Undue hardship “means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense” on 
the part of the employer, when considered in light of a list of factors, including the nature 
and cost of accommodation and the financial resources of the facility.85 The obvious 
conclusion is that Congress intended that the burden of proving undue hardship would be 
onerous.86 
The other defenses to the ADA differ from Title VII.  The ADA contains no 
defense for bona fide seniority systems87 or for a bona fide occupational qualification.88 
Furthermore, unlike Title VII, under the ADA the employer may require “that an 
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety” to other persons in the 
workplace.89 
Title VII's charge-filing and other enforcement procedures are incorporated into 
the ADA for the employment provisions of the ADA.90 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
amended Title VII and the ADA to provide for compensatory and punitive damages in 
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intentional discrimination cases.91 However, the Amendment provides that, if the 
employer acts in good faith to provide a reasonable accommodation, the employer has a 
defense to the imposition of damages.92 
Although the ADA specifically provides that it shall not be interpreted less 
generously than its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act, 93 the Supreme Court has not 
taken this provision very seriously.  The Court has substantially narrowed the 
interpretation of the term “disability” under the ADA in all but one case, and it is not an 
employment case.94 
B.  Supreme Court Interpretations 
1.  “[A]n individual with disabilities” 
a. Bragdon v. Abbott 
The Supreme Court’s first foray into the ADA battle in 1998 appeared to signal 
that it would read the Act expansively.  The question in Bragdon v. Abbott was whether a 
healthcare professional had the right to refuse to treat an HIV positive patient in his 
office.95 The Court explained that in order to be protected by the ADA, the plaintiff had 
to be “an individual with disabilities,” which is defined as having an impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity.  The Court noted that the definition of disability 
was derived from the Rehabilitation Act and further noted that the ADA requires that it 
be construed according to the law and regulations developed under the Rehabilitation 
Act.  Consequently, the Court adopted the definition of impairment developed under 
regulations under the Rehabilitation Act, 96 which is a mental or physical condition that 
affects one or more body systems.  The Court found that HIV was an impairment at every 
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stage because of the immediacy with which the virus infects the blood cells and the 
severity of the disease.97 
Having determined that the plaintiff had an impairment, the Court moved on to 
whether the impairment substantially affected a major life activity.  The Court cited the 
regulations, noting again that the ADA must be construed consistently with the 
Rehabilitation Act regulations.  The ADA regulations, copied from the Rehabilitation Act 
regulations, provide a representative list of major life activities which include "functions 
such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, 
speaking, breathing, learning, and working."98 The Court reasoned that reproduction, the 
major life activity alleged to be limited in this case, is central to life and should be 
considered a major life activity.99 The Court said that the regulations did not help to 
determine the meaning of “substantially limited,”100 but concluded that “substantially 
limited” does not mean utter inability.  The plaintiff was substantially limited because 
reproduction was dangerous to public health.  The Court also bolstered its conclusion that 
asymptomatic AIDS was a handicap or disability by reference to all the courts and 
agencies that had so held under the Rehabilitation Act.101 The Court stopped short of 
holding that AIDS is a per se disability, nor did it hold that the determination of disability 
would require an individualized inquiry, except by saying that in this case, the plaintiff 
alleged she was substantially limited in reproduction.102 The implication was that if 
reproduction were not at issue, a plaintiff would have to identify another major life 
activity in which she was substantially limited.  The idea that an individualized inquiry 
would be required in every case originated in the dissent.103 The Court made it clear in 
13
the next case that a strict individualized inquiry is necessary to determine whether the 
plaintiff is disabled and that there are no per se or presumptively disabling impairments. 
 
b.  Sutton v. United Air Lines and companions 
1)  Sutton 
Sutton v. United Air Lines104 involved two sisters who applied for jobs as 
commercial airline pilots.  They were told that they did not meet the minimum 
requirement for uncorrected eyesight, which was 20/100.  The plaintiffs’ eyesight was 
significantly worse than that, although it was corrected to 20/20 with corrective lenses.  
The first question before the Court was whether the plaintiffs’ visual impairment would 
be viewed in its corrected or uncorrected state to determine whether they were disabled 
under the ADA.105 
The Court started out by saying that the EEOC had issued regulations defining 
disability, although no agency had been delegated authority to do so.106 The conflict was 
not with regard to the regulations, but with the EEOC guidance interpreting the 
regulations.  The Court noted that the EEOC defined disability, as did the ADA, as “‘A) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of such the major life 
activities of such individual;  B) a record of an impairment; or C)  being regarded as 
having such an impairment.’”107 The plaintiffs alleged first that they were disabled under 
subsection A), the first prong of the disability test because they suffered from an 
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.  The EEOC guidance directed 
that disability should be determined in its uncorrected state.108 Because the plaintiffs 
were severely myopic, they clearly would be disabled, if the measure were their 
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uncorrected state.  The Court, however, decided that this guidance conflicted with the 
plain language of the ADA, and to evaluate persons “in their hypothetical uncorrected 
state. . .is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.”109 The Court reasoned that the 
statute expressed disability in the present tense, “substantially limits;” and that the 
inquiry is individualized, so that the question is whether the individual is currently 
disabled.  However, the Court was unduly impressed by the fact that Congress had 
determined that 43 million people were disabled, and if mitigating measures were not 
considered, the figure would be much higher.  
Thus, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had an impairment which, in its 
corrected state did not substantially limit any major life activity.110 The plaintiffs were, 
thus, not disabled under the first prong of the Act.   
The plaintiffs argued alternatively under subsection (C) of the disability test that 
they were regarded as disabled by the employer.  The Court said that there were two 
possibilities that could arise under this part of the ADA, either the employee has an 
impairment that is not substantially limiting or the employee has no impairment at all.  In 
either situation, the employer must believe that the impairment is substantially 
limiting.111 The plaintiffs alleged that the employer regarded them as disabled in the 
major life activity of working.   
The Court restricted the category of “working” very narrowly, based on the 
EEOC regulations.112 Thus, being substantially limited in the major life activity of 
working, the Court said, requires  
at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad 
class of jobs. Reflecting this requirement, the EEOC uses a specialized 
definition of the term “substantially limits” when referring to the major 
life activity of working : “significantly restricted in the ability to perform 
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either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as 
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and 
abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not 
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”113 
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were only precluded from one job, that of 
global airline pilot, so they were not regarded as substantially limited in working.114 The 
Court expressed reluctance to even regard “working” as a major life activity.   
Because the parties accept that the term "major life activities" includes 
working, we do not determine the validity of the cited regulations.  We 
note, however, that there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining 
"major life activities" to include work, for it seems "to argue in a circle to 
say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment, from 
working with others] . . . then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, 
when the question you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by 
reason of handicap."115 
The Court then “assumed without deciding” that working is a major life activity116 and 
has continued to do so since.117 
2)  Implications of Sutton 
The Court’s refusal to fully accept working as a major life activity is inconsistent 
with the Court’s acceptance of the identical language in the HEW regulations construing 
the Rehabilitation Act and cited in Bragdon v. Abbott as controlling.118 In addition, there 
is no question that working represents an activity of central importance to most people’s 
lives.  “Working is a major part of being ‘normal’ in our society.”119 Comparing working 
to the other life activities that the Court has recognized as “major life activities,” such as 
“household chores, bathing and brushing one’s teeth,”120 as well as reproduction,121 
working must certainly be included from a rational point of view.  Furthermore, the 
agency interpretations, which are binding under the ADA, have always included it.122 
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The Court did not continue its indulgent interpretation of the ADA begun in Bragdon in 
another important aspect.   
The Court in Sutton also made it clear that there were no per se disabilities, citing 
Bragdon v. Abbott for the proposition.123 In fact Bragdon v. Abbott did not require a 
strict individualized inquiry, but rather it relied heavily on authority that considered 
asymptomatic HIV a disability in every case.124 The only individualized inquiry was in 
which major life activity the plaintiff was restricted.  She alleged reproduction, but the 
Court indicated that there could be others, such sexual activity.125 The Court was clearly 
assuming in the Bragdon case that HIV would be disabling in every case, although it may 
affect different major life activities. 
Beginning with the Sutton case, however, the Court has charted its own course, 
ignoring legislative history, agency regulations, and guidances, as well as caselaw 
developed under the Rehabilitation Act.  The legislative history is clear that Congress 
intended that disability be determined in its uncorrected state, and all the agencies 
interpreting the Act had held so.126 
The Court took an easy case and made bad law.  No one wants the ADA to protect 
everyone who has to wear glasses.  It obviously trivializes the protected class; however, 
the ramifications of Sutton go far beyond the population of people wearing corrective 
lenses.  The Court has been criticized for placing so much reliance on the number of 
disabled people cited by Congress, a figure that was posited to be inclusive, rather than 
exclusive, of disability.127 Why did the Supreme Court exalt the figure cited by Congress 
of 43 million disabled people over the much more important Congressionally expressed 
remedial objectives of the ADA? 
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The Sutton dissenters had the better view:  
We must draw a statutory line that either (1) will include within the 
category of persons authorized to bring suit under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 some whom Congress may not have wanted to 
protect (those who wear ordinary eyeglasses), or (2) will exclude from the 
threshold category those whom Congress certainly did want to protect 
(those who successfully use corrective devices or medicines, such as 
hearing aids or prostheses or medicine for epilepsy). Faced with this 
dilemma, the statute's language, structure, basic purposes, and history 
require us to choose the former statutory line, as Justice STEVENS 
(whose opinion I join) well explains. I would add that, if the more 
generous choice of threshold led to too many lawsuits that ultimately 
proved without merit or otherwise drew too much time and attention away 
from those whom Congress clearly sought to protect, there is a remedy.128 
As the dissent explained, the Act was not supposed to weed people out in the first 
instance.  It would not require that airlines hire people who pose a danger, rather the Act 
requires that employers justify their employment requirements.129 
3)  Companion case 
Had the Court used one of the companion cases130 to Sutton, Albertson’s Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg,131 to express its unauthorized interpretation of the ADA, it would have been 
more obvious that clearly intended beneficiaries of the ADA would lose protection.  In 
the Kirkingburg case, the plaintiff suffered from amblyobia, which is uncorrectable, so 
that he could really only see out of one eye.132 Kirkingburg was erroneously hired 
because the employer required that all drivers meet the Department of Transportation 
requirements, and he could not.133 He drove for over a year before the mistake was 
discovered, and he was fired.  Kirkingburg obtained a waiver of the requirement from the 
Department of Transportation, but the employer would not accept it and refused to re-hire 
him.134 The question before the Court was whether the employer was justified in relying 
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on the DOT requirements, which a unanimous Court answered in the affirmative because 
the DOT waiver program was experimental and not designed to certify safe drivers.135 
The pernicious part of the opinion was the Court’s unscrupulous chastisement of 
the lower court for so easily finding that Kirkingburg was disabled in the first place.136 
The Court said that the lower court had made three missteps in its finding that 
Kirkingburg was disabled.137 
First, the Court said that although amblyopia is an impairment and “seeing” is a 
major life activity, a person with that impairment is not necessarily substantially limited 
in seeing.  The lower court had in fact said that “‘the manner in which [Kirkingburg] sees 
differs significantly from the manner in which most people see’ because, ‘[t]o put it in its 
simplest terms [he] sees using only one eye; most people see using two.’"138 The Court 
characterized this determination as the lower court’s appearing to be “willing to settle for 
a mere difference.”139 This clearly contradicts the lower court’s holding in this regard 
and ups the bar for the finding of “significantly limited” in a major life activity. 
Secondly, the Court found fault with the lower court’s view that it was irrelevant 
whether the plaintiff had made subconscious compensation for his monocular vision.  
The Court reiterated from Sutton that mitigating measures, even if produced by the body 
and not by artificial aids, must be taken into account.140 
Finally, the Court said that the lower court did not pay sufficient heed to the 
requirement of an individualized inquiry.  The Court said “[s]ome impairments may 
invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity . . . , we cannot say that 
monocularity does.”141 Again, it should be noted that the lower court clearly said that 
Kirkingburg could essentially see out of only one eye.  It is incredible that the Supreme 
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Court should require more.  The Court did ultimately concede that monocular vision 
would ordinarily be disabling, but its analysis is nevertheless very troubling.142 The 
Court was clearly requiring much more than was generally required under prior law to 
show that a person was substantially limited in a major life activity, but the Court was not 
finished in this regard, as the next case demonstrates. 
c.  Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams 
The Court returned to defining “substantially limited” in a “major life activity” in 
Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams.143 The plaintiff’s use of pneumatic tools while working 
for the defendant caused her to suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis.  She 
was placed on permanent work restrictions that precluded, among other things, lifting 
more than 20 pounds, using vibratory tools, engaging in repetitive flexion of her wrists or 
elbows or performing overhead work.  She was accommodated in a job that did not 
require any of this; however, extra duties were added to the job that she could not 
perform, and she was ultimately discharged.144 It seems clear that she was disabled, but 
she had a problem identifying the major life activity that would allow her to prove that 
she was disabled.   
She started out arguing that her impairment substantially limited her in the major 
life activities of performing manual tasks, housework, gardening, playing with her 
children, lifting, and working.  She also argued that she had a record of a substantially 
limiting impairment and that she was regarded as having such an impairment.  The 
District Court decided that playing with her children, gardening and doing housework 
were not major life activities, and she did not appeal that decision.  She did appeal the 
decision that she was not substantially limited in lifting, working and performing manual 
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tasks.145 The Sixth Circuit reversed the finding that she was not substantially limited in 
her ability to perform manual tasks.  The court said that she had shown a class of manual 
activities that she could not perform at work.  The court then cited a range of activities 
that she could not perform, not just in her job, but in various related jobs, such as 
assembly line jobs, manual product handling jobs, manual building trade jobs that require 
gripping tools and repetitive work with hands and arms extended over the shoulder for 
any extended periods.146 
The Supreme Court limited its consideration to the manual tasks holding and said 
that the lower court had erred in assessing whether she was disabled by looking at what 
work she could perform, instead of whether she could take care of her personal hygiene 
and carry out personal or household chores.  The Court proceeded to define major life 
activities as those that are of central importance to daily life.  “That these terms need to 
be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is 
confirmed by the first section of the ADA.” The Court again cited for this proposition the 
reference to 43 million disabled persons in the preamble to the Act147 that the Court had 
cited in Sutton.148 The Court said that to be significantly limited in a major life activity, 
an impairment “must prevent or severely restrict the person from performing activities 
that are of central importance to most people lives.”149 Occupation-specific tasks are not 
necessarily of central importance to most peoples’ lives, while “household chores, 
bathing and brushing one’s teeth” are.150 The Court said that the plaintiff had said she 
could still perform all these activities, but had difficulty sweeping, had to occasionally 
have help in dressing, and could not play with her children or drive for long periods.  The 
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Court said she was not so “severely” restricted in activities that are of central importance 
to most people’s lives to amount to a manual task disability.151 
Having again severely restricted plaintiffs in their ability to prove that they were 
disabled in employment cases, the Court proceeded to decide several cases that do not 
deal with the definition of disability.  These cases, however, do illustrate the point that 
the Court has been hostile to employees in its interpretation of the ADA.  
 
2.  Other cases decided under Title I that expand the employer’s ability to defeat an ADA 
claim 
 
In Chevron v. Echazabal, the Supreme Court looked at the meaning of the “direct 
threat” defense.152 The act defines discrimination as, among other things, using 
“qualification standards ... that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a 
disability" unless the qualification standard is job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.153 The Act further provides that an employer may have a qualification 
standard that “an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other 
individuals in the workplace."154 The defendant had rejected the plaintiff based on a 
liver condition that the defendant’s physicians said would be exacerbated by contact with 
toxins in the refinery where the plaintiff worked.   
The EEOC regulations “allowed an employer to screen out a potential worker 
with a disability not only for risks that he would pose to others in the workplace but for 
risks on the job to his own health or safety as well.”155 The Supreme Court determined 
that the EEOC’s interpretation of the Act was reasonable.  The Court did not find 
persuasive the legislative history of the Act that indicated Congress’ concern for 
22
paternalism in enacting the Act or the plain language of the statute, that the direct threat 
defense was limited to a direct threat to others.156 As in Sutton, the Court approved of the 
EEOC’s interpretation when it restricted the protected class.157 
In another defeat for a plaintiff, in Raytheon v. Hernandez,158 the Supreme Court 
applied its interpretation of the defense of “legitimate non-discriminatory reason” to the 
ADA to find for the defendant.  In the Raytheon case, the plaintiff had been discharged 
for violating work rules by testing positive for drugs.  Two years later, he applied again 
and was refused hire.  The defendant said at first it was because of the plaintiff’s past 
drug use, but ultimately decided to interpose the defense of a neutral policy that 
precluded rehiring anyone who had been discharged for misconduct.159 The Court said 
that this was a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.160 
Legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was developed by the Court as a defense to 
intentional discrimination, disparate treatment, cases under Title VII;161 however, it may 
not be an appropriate defense to all disparate treatment cases under the ADA.  Any 
reason that is not based on the plaintiff’s protected status is a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason under Title VII.162 The ADA, however, provides that the employer 
may not have a policy that screens out people with the plaintiff’s disability unless the 
policy is justified by business necessity.163 Because the no-rehire policy screens out 
people with the plaintiff’s disability, the employer should have been required to justify it, 
even in a disparate treatment case.  However, the Court has now put the burden on the 
plaintiff to show that the defendant’s use of the policy was not a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason.164 
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The Court criticized the court of appeals for conflating the two theories of 
disparate treatment and disparate impact in determining that a neutral policy is not a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, if it has a disparate impact on the protected class.165 
The Supreme Court is actually the court doing the conflating by treating disparate 
treatment under Title VII and disparate treatment under the ADA the same.  Under Title 
VII, the defendant discriminates if he treats a member of a protected class differently 
from a member of another class.  Under the ADA, the defendant may be guilty of 
discrimination if he doesn’t treat disabled people differently from non-disabled people.166 
The employer must offer reasonable accommodation to disabled people.167 In addition, 
the non-discrimination requirement of the ADA requires that the employer not maintain 
policies that screen out disabled people.168 The Court determined that the latter defense 
is implicated only in a disparate impact case.169 This contradicts the decision in Chevron 
v. Echazabal, in which the Court allowed the defendant to interpose the business 
necessity defense, which is the defense to a disparate impact case, in a case that involved 
disparate treatment.170 
Having severely restricted the plaintiff’s ability to prove discrimination under the 
employment provisions of the ADA, the Court turned to a delineation of “reasonable 
accommodation without undue hardship.”  The Court’s entry into this area was in a non-
employment case.   
 
3.  Cases interpreting reasonable accommodation 
In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin171 a professional golfer asked for an 
exemption from the rule that players must walk instead of use a golf cart in certain 
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situations.  The plaintiff had a degenerative circulatory disorder that had atrophied his 
right leg so that he could no longer walk the golf course.  The defendant contended that 
exempting the plaintiff from the rule prohibiting the use of golf carts would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition.172 
Title III of the ADA applies to public accommodations and has somewhat 
different language from Title I that applies to employment.  Title III defines as 
discrimination the failure to make reasonable modifications unless making such 
reasonable modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the “goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodation.”173 However, since fundamental 
alteration is a type of undue hardship,174 the case has implications for what a reasonable 
accommodation without an undue hardship is under Title I, as well.   
The Court said that the use of golf carts is not inconsistent with the fundamental 
character of the game, citing their ubiquitous use on golf courses and the rules of golf 
followed by most golfers that did not refer to use of carts in describing the object of the 
game.175 The defendant contended that “the walking rule is ‘outcome determinative’ 
because fatigue may adversely affect performance.”176 The Supreme Court did not agree, 
but even assuming this to be the case, the Court said that the ADA requires an individual 
inquiry into whether the accommodation is reasonable in a particular case.  Because the 
plaintiff suffers greater fatigue than normal, the purpose of the walking rule would not be 
compromised.  Thus, modifying a “peripheral rule” would not fundamentally alter the 
game.177 
Having distributed largesse once again in a non-employment case defining Title 
III’s analogue to undue hardship, the Supreme Court proceeded to interpret the Act 
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narrowly in its first reasonable accommodation/undue hardship employment case under 
the ADA.  In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,178 the Supreme Court addressed the terms 
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” for the first time under the ADA.  
The plaintiff’s request for an accommodation required overriding the employer’s 
seniority system.  The Court decided that overriding the seniority system would not be a 
reasonable accommodation in the usual case.179 In reaching this decision, the Court 
provided insight, not only into the nature of reasonable accommodation, but also into the 
burden of proving reasonable accommodation and undue hardship.   
With regard to the burden of proving reasonable accommodation and undue 
hardship, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that he need only prove that an 
accommodation is effective.  The Court said that an effective accommodation is not 
necessarily reasonable for the business.180 Thus, the employee bears the burden of 
proving that an accommodation was reasonable, meaning feasible for the employer in the 
usual case.  Once the plaintiff has met this burden, the employer must prove that the 
accommodation is an undue hardship in the particular case.  In the Barnett case, then, the 
Court said that a violation of the seniority system would not be a reasonable 
accommodation in the usual case, so the employee would have to show special 
circumstances in order to prevail on its burden of showing reasonable accommodation.181 
In other words, the employee bears the burden of proving not only that he is 
disabled but that he can perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable 
accommodation, and also that the accommodation is not unreasonable and not an undue 
hardship “in the usual case.”  The employer bears no burden of proof unless he has to 
show that the accommodation is an undue hardship in this particular case. 
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The net effect of the Court’s cases detailed above, in addition to the restrictive 
interpretation of reasonable accommodation and legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, is 
to limit the protected class to employees who are almost totally restricted in a major life 
activity, which has to important to the everyday life of most people.  Thus, it is difficult 
to see who, other than persons who are totally unable to see, hear, or walk, will be 
included in the protected class.  People with less restricting impairments, such as 
alcoholism, are now rarely able to prove that they are disabled.182 
IV.  Alcoholism under the ADA 
Because of the restrictive interpretation of “individual with a disability,” few if 
any alcoholics could be considered to be disabled under the ADA and consequently 
would not be entitled to the mildest of accommodations to maintain their sobriety.  The 
alcoholic may be put in the bind of being unable to maintain his sobriety without time to 
go to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings or counseling.  If he relapses, he will be fired 
because he is not able to measure up to the requirements of the job.  Under the ADA, the 
question for alcoholics is 1) whether they are disabled;  2)  if they are disabled, whether 
they are entitled to reasonable accommodation;  and 3)  if so, what would be a reasonable 
accommodation?   
The first problem for purposes of the ADA is, whether an alcoholic, active or 
recovering, can ever prove that he is disabled and thus be entitled to any of the 
accommodations necessary to secure and maintain his sobriety?  In order to prove that he 
is disabled, a plaintiff must prove that he has an impairment that substantially limits a 
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major life activity and that he can perform the essential duties of the job with or without 
reasonable accommodation.183 
A.  Alcoholism and Drug Addiction under the ADA generally  
The first question is whether an alcoholic has an impairment.  The Regulations 
define impairment as a physiological disorder or condition, as well as a mental or 
psychological disorder.184 Alcoholism is considered both a physical and psychological 
impairment, as discussed above.185 Although scientists disagree as to the exact nature of 
the impairment, all agree that it is an impairment of some kind, as recognized by 
Congress186 and the Rehabilitation Act.187 As noted, the ADA must provide no less than 
the protection afforded by the Rehabilitation Act. 
In the ADA, Congress distinguished drug addicts from alcoholics and excluded 
active drug addicts from the protection of the Act, as well as employees and applicants 
who are currently using illegal drugs.188 However, the protection of the Act is reinstated 
if the drug addict has “successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program 
and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated 
successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;” “is participating in a supervised 
rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use;” or “is erroneously 
regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use.”189 
The employer may forbid the use of alcohol and drugs on the premises and 
impose the same job requirements on alcoholics and drug addicts as required of other 
employees, even if unsatisfactory performance is related to the drug use or alcoholism of 
such employee.190 The ADA also allows employers to institute drug testing to ensure that 
a drug addict is no longer using drugs.191 
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For purposes of this article, I will treat recovering alcoholics and recovering drug 
addicts the same because both are theoretically protected by the ADA.  Again, the ADA 
also protects active alcoholics, but not active drug addicts.192 
The next question in deciding whether the alcoholic, active or recovering, is 
disabled is whether his impairment substantially limits him in a major life activity.193 
With regard to the question of whether he has an impairment, Congress and the lower 
courts have always assumed that alcoholism is an impairment, and, until recently, a per se 
disability.  The Supreme Court has not always been so generous.  
 
B.  Cases on Alcoholism 
1.  Supreme Court cases 
The Supreme Court has not dealt with cases under the ADA that involve 
alcoholism, although it did decide a case involving a drug addict, as discussed earlier, in 
which the Court did not reach the issue of drug addiction.194 In addition, as discussed 
below, the Court has decided one case involving alcoholism under the Rehabilitation 
Act.195 Other than that, the Court has decided only one other case involving alcoholism, 
and as in all of these cases, the Court has been less than charitable toward alcoholics and 
addicts. 
Powell v. Texas 196 involved whether an alcoholic could be criminally sanctioned 
for public drunkenness.  The Court opined in this 1968 opinion that an alcoholic was 
better off in jail than out on the street intoxicated. 
[F]acilities for the attempted treatment of indigent alcoholics are woefully 
lacking throughout the country. [footnote omitted] It would be tragic to 
return large numbers of helpless, sometimes dangerous and frequently 
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unsanitary inebriates to the streets of our cities without even the 
opportunity to sober up adequately which a brief jail term provides.197 
This opinion reflects many of the stereotypes the ADA was designed to 
ameliorate.  Also, it could be argued that the Court’s cabined 1968 view of alcoholics and 
the disease of alcoholism might have changed with more advanced medical 
understanding of alcoholism as a disease.198 However, several years later, in a case 
decided under the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court did not treat alcoholism more 
indulgently.   
In 1988, in Traynor v. Turnage,199 the question before the Court was whether, in 
enacting the Rehabilitation Act, Congress was rejecting the position it had taken a year 
earlier under the law relating to veterans, which denominated primary alcoholism as 
“willful misconduct” for which the plaintiffs could lose their benefits.  Under the 
Veterans Administration Act, the V.A. conclusively presumed that primary alcoholism, 
as opposed to alcoholism that is secondary to mental illness, was “willful.”  The plaintiff 
contended that this conclusive presumption was inconsistent with the Rehabilitation Act’s 
requirement that mandates an individualized inquiry.  In denying their benefits, the 
plaintiffs argued that the V.A. was acting based on “generalized determinations that lack 
any substantial basis.”200 Even though the Court concluded that it did not have to decide 
whether alcoholism is a disease beyond the victim’s control, the Court nevertheless 
commented gratuitously that there was: 
“a substantial body of medical literature that even contests the proposition 
that alcoholism is a disease, much less that it is a disease for which the 
victim bears no responsibility." [citation omitted]  Indeed, even among 
many who consider alcoholism a "disease" to which its victims are 
genetically predisposed, the consumption of alcohol is not regarded as 
wholly involuntary.201 
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The Court ultimately concluded that for purposes of veteran’s benefits only, the 
Rehabilitation Act does not mandate an individualized inquiry of the factors contributing 
to primary alcoholism because Congress and the V.A. have reasonably determined that 
no such factors exist.202 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court had taken positions hostile to alcoholism 
as a disease for purposes of the criminal law and Veterans’ Administration law, the Court 
has not rejected alcoholism as a disease under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.  
Indeed, virtually all lower courts accepted alcoholism as a disability under the 
Rehabilitation Act.203 The lower courts’ position was carried over into early ADA cases, 
as well.204 
2.  Lower court cases on alcoholism under the ADA 
Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.,205 decided prior to the 
Court’s unfavorable interpretations of the ADA, discussed above,206 demonstrates how 
the ADA was supposed to work in the context of alcoholism.  The plaintiff was a 
recovering alcoholic and drug addict, who was required to give a urine sample for drug 
testing.  Because he had a medical condition known as neurogenic bladder, he was unable 
to provide the required sample in the time allowed and was fired.  He conceded that this 
condition was not a disability, but argued that his drug and alcohol addiction was.  The 
court agreed.  Although he could not show that he was currently substantially limited in a 
major life activity, the court found that he had a record of a disability.  
We, moreover, have previously held that "substance abuse is a 
'handicap' for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act,"  [citation omitted.]  And 
this is highly relevant since the ADA states that "[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply 
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a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [citation omitted] or the regulations issued by 
Federal agencies pursuant to such title. [citation omitted]. . . . 
Furthermore, the legislative history of the ADA also indicates that the law 
was intended to apply to recovering addicts. The committee reports state 
that the term "physical or mental impairment" includes, inter alia, "drug 
addiction[ ] and alcoholism." [citations omitted] 207 
The plaintiff also had to prove that his addiction substantially limited one or more 
major life activities in the past to prove that he had a record of a disability.  The court did 
not elaborate but concluded that, having shown that he had a record of having an 
addiction, it could be assumed that he had met this prong.208 The court ultimately 
decided that the company was discriminating against recovering addicts who had the 
plaintiff’s bladder condition because they were required to give a urine sample more 
frequently.  Other people who were not recovering addicts but who had the same bladder 
condition were not required to give a urine sample with such frequency.  While it would 
be an undue hardship for the company to test the plaintiff less frequently because this 
would endanger its drug-free workplace status, the company could easily accommodate 
the plaintiff by giving him more time to produce the sample.209 
The court’s analysis in Buckley illustrates the way the ADA was working, and 
was supposed to work, in such a case, but after the Supreme Court’s unfavorable spate of 
decisions interpreting the ADA,210 the cases dealing with alcoholism are almost 
uniformly holding that the alcoholic plaintiff was unable to prove that he was disabled.211 
Although the plaintiff has three ways of claiming protection of the ADA, the 
alcoholic plaintiff is currently succeeding in none of these possibilities.  As discussed 
below, to be a member of the protected class, the plaintiff must prove that he has an 
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impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or that he was regarded by the 
employer as having such an impairment or that he has a record of such an impairment.   
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a.  Whether the plaintiff is in the protected class 
1)  Whether the plaintiff has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity 
 
After Sutton, the courts no longer hold that alcoholism is a per se disability.212 
The trend toward determining that alcoholism is not a disability, however, began prior to 
the Sutton case, as some courts began to restrictively interpret the meaning of 
disability.213 In a pre-Sutton case, Burch v. Coca Cola Co.,214 the court said that 
alcoholism is not a per se disability215 and required the plaintiff to show that his 
alcoholism significantly limited a major life activity.  The plaintiff said that drinking 
affected his ability to sleep, think, walk and talk.  The court said that his inability to 
perform these functions was temporary and no different from anyone who overindulges 
in alcohol. Although his alcoholism was permanent, the effects he referred to were not.  
The court said that the plaintiff produced no evidence of permanent alteration of gait, 
ability to speak properly, long-term insomnia or memory impairment when sober.  He 
admitted that his work was not affected and that he never drank during working hours.216 
After Sutton, virtually all courts now generally find that alcoholics are not 
significantly limited in any major life activity under the Supreme Court’s restrictive 
interpretation of that term.217 Alcoholics, especially those in recovery, have difficulty 
identifying a major life activity in which they are currently significantly limited.  The 
most likely major life activity in which alcoholics may claim to be limited in performing 
is working, which carries its own baggage, as discussed above.218 
The EEOC defines a major life activity as “functions such as caring for oneself, 
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
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working.”219 The regulations indicate that the list is not exhaustive,220 and that generally 
“‘major life activities’ are those basic activities that the average person in the general 
population can perform with little or no difficulty.”221 A person is “substantially limited 
in a major life activity if he is unable to perform or is “significantly restricted as . . . to 
the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general 
population can perform” that activity.222 
Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.223 is a good example of the difficulty of proving 
that alcoholism is a disability.  In the Bailey case, the plaintiff was an active alcoholic 
whose attempts at recovery had been unsuccessful.  Despite this fact, he had generally 
been able to fulfill his job duties.  The plaintiff was eventually jailed for driving under the 
influence and asked the defendant to allow him to work on a work-release program.  The 
plaintiff contended that he was entitled to this as a reasonable accommodation.  The 
defendant declined and terminated the plaintiff for excessive leave.224 
The court decided that the plaintiff was not disabled, even though there is no 
question but that alcoholism is “an impairment” under the ADA.  However, the court said 
that, although alcoholism is not excluded from the ADA, it is treated differently, noting 
the requirement that alcoholics be held to the same standards as other employees and that 
they can be required to not be under the influence at work.225 The court said that 
generally alcoholism is not recognized as a per se disability under the Act, so that the 
plaintiff must make an individualized showing.226 
The plaintiff contended that he was substantially limited in working, but the court 
said that he did not show that he was unable to perform a broad range of jobs.  To prove 
that he was substantially limited in working, he would have to show that he could not 
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“perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to 
the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.”227 The court noted 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines228 cast doubt on whether 
working should be considered a major life activity.229 The court said that proof that one 
is so limited must relate to the relevant geographic area; the numbers and types of jobs in 
the area from which the plaintiff is foreclosed; and the types of training, skills and 
abilities the jobs require.230 The plaintiff showed only that he had difficulty performing 
his job, and even that showing was weak because he was usually able to perform.  The 
fact that he was incarcerated and unable to perform was short term and not a substantial 
limitation.231 
Similarly in Boerst v. General Mills Operations, Inc.,232 the plaintiff, a recovering 
alcoholic, suffered from anxiety, fatigue, difficulty sleeping, and an inability to 
concentrate.233 The court held that he was not disabled.  The court said that sleeping and 
working are major life activities, but that concentrating and maintaining stamina are not.  
The court said that he had to show that either he could not perform a major life activity 
that an average person could perform or that his performance was significantly 
restricted.234 The court opined that the inability to work more than eight hours a day was 
not enough to show disability, nor did this show that he could not perform a wide range 
of jobs.  With regard to sleeping, the plaintiff showed that he slept only from two to four 
hours a night.  The court said that this was not sufficient to show that he was substantially 
limited in his ability to sleep.235 
McKay v. Town and Country Cadillac, Inc.,236 illustrates another plaintiff’s 
unsuccessful attempt to identify a substantial limitation in a major life activity.  The 
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plaintiff argued that he had produced substantial evidence that his alcoholism had a 
devastating effect on his family relations and social life.  He could not ever for the rest of 
his life go to any social event where alcohol was being served.  This limited his ability to 
develop social relationships and family relationships.  The court accepted that the ability 
to interact with others does constitute a major life activity, although other courts have 
held that it does not.237 However, the court said that the plaintiff was not substantially 
limited in his ability to interact with others in any event just because he could not attend 
social events where alcohol is served.  The court said that a mere alteration in lifestyle 
does not constitute a substantial limitation.  The question was whether the plaintiff was 
“‘significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which he 
performed family or social functions as compared to the condition, manner or duration 
under which the average person in the general population can perform family or social 
functioning.’”238 
Alcoholic plaintiffs, indeed most plaintiffs,239 have been unsuccessful in proving 
that they are disabled because they are unable to prove that they are sufficiently limited in 
a major life activity.  The usual problem with alcoholics is that even in recovery, they 
may be perceived by employers as unable to perform.  Thus, the plaintiff should be able 
to proceed under the second prong of the ADA, that the plaintiff was “regarded as” 
disabled.  Again, the restrictive interpretation of “significantly limited in a major life 
activity” virtually eliminates this possibility also. 
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2)  Whether the plaintiff was regarded as disabled 
 One of the principal concerns of the ADA was discrimination based on myths and 
stereotypes surrounding disabilities.  For this reason, Congress prohibited discrimination 
against persons who are regarded as disabled, even if they are not.240 The Court in Sutton 
recognized only two possibilities for the plaintiff who is trying to prove that he was 
regarded as disabled:  Either the employee has an impairment that is not substantially 
limiting, or the employee has no impairment at all.241 In either situation, the Court said, 
the employer must believe that the impairment is substantially limiting in a major life 
activity.242 There is a third possibility cited in the regulations243 that the Court did not 
cite, and that is that the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity because of 
the attitude of others to his impairment.244 This regulation was included among those that 
interpret the Rehabilitation Act, which were validated for purposes of the ADA.245 
Although the language of the statute applies the substantial limitation of a major 
life activity to all three prongs;246 nevertheless, the “regarded as” prong should focus 
primarily on how the plaintiff is treated and not on the nature of the substantial 
limitation.247 As noted, however, most courts require the plaintiff to prove not just that 
the employer acted based on stereotypes or misconceptions, but on the belief that the 
plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity.248 
Consequently, as under the actual disability prong of the disability definition, 
plaintiffs proceeding under “regarded as” prong are also being stymied by the 
requirement that they must be perceived as substantially limited in a major life activity.  
For example, in Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.249 after the court rejected the plaintiff’s 
38
contention that he was actually disabled, as discussed above,250 the plaintiff argued that 
he should be considered disabled under the alternative provisions of the ADA.251 With 
regard to whether he was regarded as disabled, the court noted that the Supreme Court 
had provided that there were two ways of being regarded as disabled.252 Under neither of 
these was the plaintiff disabled because under the major life activity of working, the 
employer did not believe that he was disabled in performing anything but his own job.253 
What immediately appears obvious is that an employer would not be concerned 
with whether the employee could perform anything but his own job.  If this is the test, the 
employer would not be concerned with whether the employee could not care for himself 
or anything else, so this avenue into the protected class would never function.  Nielson v. 
Moroni Feed Co.254 is a good example.  The plaintiff was the president of the company 
and was ousted for misconduct.  He alleged that he was erroneously perceived as being 
addicted to drugs.255 However, the court said, being erroneously regarded as using drugs 
illegally is considered a disability only if the plaintiff is perceived to be sufficiently 
impaired to substantially limit a major life activity.256 The plaintiff failed to produce 
evidence of anyone perceiving him as being limited in a major life activity.  The 
plaintiff’s contention was that the company thought his alleged drug use was severe 
enough to prevent his being able to perform his duties as company president.  The court 
said that this was insufficient to render him substantially limited in his ability to work 
because it is only one job and not a range of jobs.257 The court said the plaintiff must also 
show that the employer regarded him as unable to perform in a broad range of jobs, not 
just the job he held.  The court also cited authority for the proposition that requiring that 
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the employer believe that the employee cannot perform a broad range of jobs has 
virtually eliminated the “regarded as” claim.258 
The Supreme Court in Sutton cited with approval the EEOC’s definition of the 
major life activity of working as requiring that the employee could not do a broad range 
of jobs,259 even though the Court was skeptical about working being considered a major 
life activity.260 What the Court did not note was that the EEOC had indicated in its 
guidance that the evidence needed to prove substantial limitation in working should not 
be onerous.261 In addition, the guidance provides that one rejected from a job because of 
“myths, fears, and stereotypes” would be covered by this prong regardless of whether 
others shared this view or not.262 Clearly, the employer’s belief of whether the employee 
was able to perform a wide range of jobs or not would be less relevant under the EEOC’s 
guidance. 
Shiplett v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.263 is an example of how “regarded 
as” should work.  The plaintiff had been prescribed a highly addictive prescription drug 
for a sleep disorder.264 The plaintiff contended that the employer regarded him as 
disabled.  The court said that the plaintiff had not specified what major life activities the 
defendant regarded the plaintiff as substantially limited in performing, so it assumed that 
the defendant regarded the plaintiff as substantially limited in performing his job as a 
train engineer.265 The court said that several circuits had held that the employer does not 
necessarily perceive the employee as being disabled simply because he cannot perform a 
particular job.266 The court decided that a broad range of jobs was involved in this case, 
however, because if the defendant perceived the plaintiff as unable to perform the 
engineer job, then he would be unable to perform a wide range of safety sensitive jobs.267 
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Many courts interpret “broad range of jobs” to even require the plaintiff to seek 
work outside his profession.  For example, in Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, 
Ltd.,268 the plaintiff pharmacist was fired after he went into treatment for drug addiction.  
The plaintiff argued that he was regarded as a drug addict.  The only feasible major life 
activity in which he could argue he was substantially limited was working, and he could 
only show that his employer believed that he could not be a pharmacist.  The court said 
that a broad range of jobs was required, not just the inability to perform in his desired 
field, citing similar cases.269 
Unless the courts are willing to interpret the term “substantially limited in a major 
life activity” more generously, that leaves only the last possibility for claiming protection, 
“having a record of a disability.”  Even here, the same problem arises; the plaintiff cannot 
prove that he has a record of being substantially limited in a major life activity.   
 
3)  Whether the plaintiff has a record of having a disability 
 The intent of the “having a record of a disability” prong was to protect one from 
discrimination who has a history of a disability or who has been misclassified as 
disabled.270 This should be an easier route for alcoholics, who usually have a record of a 
disability.  However, because having a record of a disability is not defined in the Act, and 
the Court has not clarified its meaning under the ADA, the EEOC regulations and 
guidances, along with caselaw must be referenced.  The EEOC provides that “having a 
record of” can mean a history of disability or it can mean an actual documented record, 
such as medical, educational or employment records.271 Again, however, the plaintiff has 
to prove that he has a record of a substantially limiting impairment.  Because the Court 
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requires such stringent proof that the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life 
activity, plaintiffs are having difficulty proving this prong as well.  
 In Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,272 for example, discussed above, the court 
said, with regard to the recovering alcoholic plaintiff, that “having a record of a 
disability” is supposed to protect those who have recovered or are recovering from 
substantially limiting impairments from discrimination based on their medical history.  
Although the plaintiff had a record of an impairment, the court found that he could not 
show that he had a record of an impairment that substantially limited him in a major life 
activity, such as working.273 
In a case decided before Sutton, Burch v. Coca Cola Co.,274 also discussed 
earlier,275 the court said that the fact that the alcoholic plaintiff had been hospitalized 
would be considered in whether he had a record of a disability, but that the hospital stay 
was of insufficient duration to qualify the plaintiff as having a record of a disability.276 
This decision is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in School Board of Nassau 
County v. Arline,277 in which the Court said that the plaintiff had a record of a disability 
because she had been hospitalized.278 Arline was decided under the Rehabilitation Act 
and is precedent for the ADA.279 
Even if the plaintiff could show that he was substantially limited in a major life 
activity, he still has an additional obstacle to overcome to join the protected class:  
whether he could perform the essential duties of the job. 
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4)  Whether the plaintiff is unable to perform the essential functions of the job and 
the conflict with the major life activity of working 
Title I, which applies to employment, poses additional problems for plaintiffs.  
Title I requires, in addition to being disabled, that one still be able to perform the 
essential duties of the job.  Because of the stringent requirements the Court has imposed 
on proving that a person is disabled, Title I probably protects very few people:  The 
courts require that the plaintiff be so impaired to prove that he is disabled, it is unlikely 
that he can perform the essential duties of the job.   
 As the court said in one case,280 it was “assuming without deciding” that working 
is a major life activity because of the conceptual difficulties of the analysis.  The 
problem, the court said, is that to prove that he is disabled, the plaintiff must prove that he 
is substantially limited in his ability to work; however, once the plaintiff shows that his 
ability to work is substantially limited, then he probably cannot prove that he is qualified 
for the job.281 In other words, in order to prove that he is qualified for the job, the 
plaintiff has to prove that his alcoholism does not interfere with his job, which then 
contradicts his being substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the most 
likely major life activity the alcoholic plaintiff can claim to be substantially limited in 
performing.  
 Even if plaintiffs can prove that they are substantially limited in a major life 
activity other than working, courts often find that the plaintiff could not perform the 
essential functions of the job.282 Several courts have said that showing up to work as 
scheduled is an essential function of the job, for example.283 In one case, because the 
plaintiff was in jail for driving while intoxicated, he could not show up for work.284 He 
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was terminated for excessive unauthorized absence, which is allowed by the ADA, which 
requires the employee to measure up to the employer’s standards.285 Thus, an alcoholic 
employee has an even more difficult proof problem because he can be held to the same 
performance standards as other employees.286 If he is unable to perform his job because 
of his disability, he can be discharged for failing to meet the employer’s performance 
standards.287 Because of this provision, most courts effectively relieve the employer of 
its obligation to reasonably accommodate.288 
Alcoholic plaintiffs often engage in unacceptable behavior, which can serve as the 
impetus for getting them into treatment.  Because employers are not required to 
reasonably accommodate such behavior, the alcoholic plaintiff can be fired without 
providing him the generally acceptable reasonable accommodation of leave to go to 
treatment. 
 
b.  Discharge for reasons related to disability and holding plaintiff to same standards 
1) Bad conduct 
 Although alcoholic plaintiffs’ unacceptable behavior is usually related to their 
illness, the courts disconnect the behavior from the illness and attribute the employers’ 
action to the behavior and not to the plaintiffs’ alcoholism.289 Early ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act cases, such as Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co.,290 
generally held that discharge for misconduct caused by the plaintiff’s alcoholism was 
based on a factor closely related to the plaintiff’s disability, so that firing him for the 
misconduct was the equivalent of firing him for his disability.  The court said it is like a 
plaintiff whose limp causes him to make a thump when he walks, and the employer firing 
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him for making the thumping noise.291 Later cases such as Maddox v. University of 
Tennessee,292 took a different view.  In the Maddox case, the court approved the firing of 
a football coach for driving while intoxicated, which the plaintiff alleged was causally 
connected to his alcoholism.  The Sixth Circuit held there that there is a distinction 
between discharging someone for misconduct and discharging someone for his disability.  
Otherwise the employer would have to accommodate the plaintiff’s behavior, considered 
unacceptable in other employees, because of the plaintiff’s disability.  By 2001, the 
courts were virtually unanimous in allowing employers to fire employees for misconduct, 
even if related to the employee’s disability.293 These decisions ignore the holding in 
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,294 in which the Supreme Court said that it is 
impermissible to distinguish between the effects of a disease and the disease itself. 
 Nevertheless, because the ADA requires alcoholics and drug addicts to meet the 
same performance standards as other employees, the effects of disease can be taken into 
account, if the employee is unable to measure up to the employer’s standards.295 In 
Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co.,296 the court said  
One area, however, where the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act [footnote 
omitted] recognize a dichotomy between a disability and disability-caused 
misconduct is where the disability is related to alcoholism or illegal drug 
use.   
. . . .
The reason this dichotomy exists is simple:  both the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act clearly contemplate removing from statutory protection 
unsatisfactory conduct caused by alcoholism and illegal drug use.  
Specifically, the ADA states that a covered entity 
may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of 
drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification 
standards for employment or job performance and behavior 
that such entity hold other employees, even if any 
unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the 
drug use or alcoholism of such employee. . . . 297 
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Thus, employers may fire the employee who is in possession of drugs,298 under 
the influence at work,299 excessively absent,300 or driving under the influence. 301 
In addition, employers may fire employees for legal consequences suffered from 
drinking302 and for various acts of misconduct caused by drinking.303 
These holdings have had further effect.  Courts used to say that other 
disabilities are not treated the same way as alcoholism, so that misconduct caused 
by other disabilities should not be cause for discipline.304 Nevertheless, the 
treatment accorded alcoholism in this regard has spilled over into other 
disabilities, and misconduct is cause for discipline, even if caused by the 
plaintiff’s disability other than alcoholism.305 
Another difference between alcoholism and other disabilities is that the 
employer may impose additional requirements on alcoholic employees who have 
sought leave to go to treatment.  Many employers require employees to sign 
agreements that they will seek no further accommodation; that this is their last 
chance.306 
2)  Violation of last chance agreement 
 
Nelson v. Williams Field Services Co.307 is typical of the last chance agreement 
cases.308 The defendant encouraged employees who thought they had an alcohol or drug 
problem to come forward and seek help.  The plaintiff was concerned about his alcohol 
consumption, so he was given time off for treatment if he would sign an agreement that 
he would refrain from consuming alcohol and drugs for the duration of his employment 
and submit to periodic testing.309 Three years after his return to work, the plaintiff was 
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arrested on his own time while driving under the influence of alcohol.  The district court 
found that the plaintiff had been terminated for violating the agreement not to consume 
alcohol or drugs for the duration of his employment, not because he was an alcoholic.310 
In fact, the plaintiff was discharged for violating an agreement that he was forced 
to enter into in exchange for leave to get help for his impairment, which has generally 
been recognized as a reasonable accommodation.311 The agreement made him liable to 
discharge for activities that occurred off the job for which other employees would not 
have been discharged.  Thus, he was treated differently because of his disability, a classic 
example of discrimination.312 The plaintiff made this argument in Longen v. Waterous 
Co., 313 when he was discharged for violating a last chance agreement.  The court rejected 
his argument that he had been discriminated against because the last chance agreement 
was not imposed on other employees.  He also argued that he had been discriminated 
against by being subject to termination for any use of mood altering chemicals, even if 
not in the workplace, when the employer’s rule only proscribed use of drugs in the 
workplace.  The court said that the plaintiff agreed to these further restrictions in the last 
chance agreement.314 
In another case, Nauseda v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc.,315 the plaintiff was 
required to take a breathalyzer test every day after he returned from treatment for 
alcoholism.  When the plaintiff registered positive on the test, he was fired.316 In 
response to the contention that requiring him to take a breathalyzer test was 
discriminatory, the court said that it was a rather generous accommodation.  Rather than 
firing him, the company allowed him to return to work if he would take the test.  It was 
reasonable for the company to want some assurance that the plaintiff was not under the 
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influence because it would affect the safety of the workers who had to work with heavy 
equipment.  As the court said, “[a]lcoholism is very difficult to overcome . . . .[g]enerally, 
one does not undergo treatment for alcoholism and become immediately cured, which is 
clear from [the plaintiff’s] own long history of treatment.”317 This is exactly why the 
plaintiff needs more than one chance to get into recovery.  Requiring him to sign a last 
chance agreement when he has only had one chance to get into recovery consigns many 
alcoholics to job-loss because relapse is characteristic of the disease.  A reasonable 
accommodation should include some tolerance for relapse, and employees should not be 
discriminated against because they obtained a reasonable accommodation to go to 
treatment.318 
c.  Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable accommodation  
 The issue of reasonable accommodation is complicated by several factors.  If the 
alcoholic is considered disabled because he is regarded as such or has a record of being 
disabled, he may not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation.319 Several courts have 
held that if the plaintiff is not in fact disabled, but is being discriminated against because 
of his record of a disability or because the employer regards him as disabled, the plaintiff 
does not need an accommodation.320 The clear language of the Act does not distinguish 
among three prongs of the disability definition in requiring reasonable accommodation; 
thus, reasonable accommodation should be required for all three prongs, not just in the 
case of actual disability.321 An alcoholic has an impairment but is generally unable to 
prove that it is substantially limiting.  Thus, if he is perceived by his employer as so 
substantially limited that he cannot do the job, he should be entitled to a reasonable 
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accommodation to fulfill the purposes of the ADA and to enable him to be a productive 
worker.  322 
If he is entitled to a reasonable accommodation, there are two factors that must be 
considered with regard to alcoholics:  One is that reasonable accommodation must be 
limited so that it does not enable an alcoholic to continue drinking.323 However, an 
alcoholic should be sufficiently accommodated to enable him to get into recovery and 
stay in recovery by attending counseling and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.324 He 
should also be given a second chance if he relapses and not be summarily discharged for 
one slip.325 
Before the Court’s narrowing of the definition of disability, beginning in 1999, 
the lower courts uniformly held that alcoholism was a disability;326 however, even then, 
alcoholics were rarely successful in getting a reasonable accommodation beyond time off 
to go to treatment.327 The reason for this was the provision of the ADA that allows 
employers to impose the same job requirements on alcoholics and drug addicts as 
required of other employees, even if unsatisfactory performance is related to the drug use 
or alcoholism of such employee.328 
In addition, the plaintiff may be allowed only one treatment.  In Evans v. Federal 
Express Corp.,329 for example, the court said that the plaintiff had already been 
reasonably accommodated by being given a leave to go to treatment for cocaine 
addiction, so that her second request for leave was not a reasonable accommodation.  The 
plaintiff said that she would be qualified, if allowed the second leave.  The court said that 
generally the employer cannot refuse the accommodation and then fire the plaintiff 
because of inadequate performance.  One consideration is likelihood of success, and the 
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court said that the company could consider a second treatment not likely to succeed 
because the first one did not succeed.  Also the court said that treatments for addiction are 
“notoriously chancy.”330 Even though the plaintiff was currently sober, the company 
could rely on what it knew at the time.  The court said that even if the company 
sometimes gave multiple leaves, it was not required to and that the EEOC does not 
require multiple leave for treatment for addiction.331 The Court also said that even “in a 
more sympathetic setting—a treatment for cluster migraines” the court did not require 
multiple leaves.332 
For any manifestations of the plaintiff’s illness, there is virtual universal 
agreement that the employer does not have to accommodate such things as excessive 
absenteeism.333 The refusal of courts to give alcoholics a second chance ignores the fact 
that relapse is a symptom of the illness and frequently occurs.  The courts, however, 
balance the two concerns of not enabling the alcoholic to continue drinking and providing 
reasonable accommodation to get into recovery by refusing to give the alcoholic a second 
chance, which is often what he needs to get into recovery.  It is in giving multiple 
chances that the employer would be enabling the alcoholic; failing to give a second 
chance ignores the reality of the situation.334 However, most alcoholic employees are no 
longer entitled to any accommodation under the ADA, even to go to treatment, because 
effectively they are no longer covered by the ADA. 
 
V.  Analysis and Proposed Solution 
Under the Court’s recent decisions, is an alcoholic, active or recovering, ever 
disabled?  The impairment must significantly limit him in a major life activity.  Because 
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this is an individualized inquiry, each active alcoholic must prove the major life activities 
in which he is limited.  Many active alcoholics have difficulty sleeping, working, driving, 
performing manual tasks, or taking care of themselves.335 They may have an assortment 
of physical illnesses.336 However, as noted above, most active alcoholics are functional 
and able to work,337 so they may not be able to prove that they are “sufficiently limited” 
in any “major life activity,” under the Court’s restrictive interpretation of those terms.338 
The irony of the Court’s decisions is that only a relatively non-functional active alcoholic 
could possibly prove that he is presently disabled and entitled to reasonable 
accommodation that could allow him to continue to drink, assuming he could perform the 
duties of the job with accommodation.  If he does get into recovery, he almost certainly 
loses the protection of the Act.   
After the Sutton case, the Court must measure a disability in its corrected state.  
Thus, the question then becomes, is a recovering alcoholic ever disabled and entitled to 
reasonable accommodation?  The impairment has to be presently impairing a major life 
activity, so the unmitigated state of the impairment is not relevant in determining whether 
the employee is presently impaired.339 The only life activity that the impairment in its 
mitigated state significantly limits in every case is drinking alcohol.340 Because the Court 
has restrictively interpreted major life activity to be an activity that is of central 
importance to most people’s lives,341 drinking would likely not be a major life activity.  
The people to whom drinking is of central importance are alcoholics, so it is unlikely that 
a recovering alcoholic is significantly limited in a major life activity. 
If a recovering alcoholic relapses, he can be fired for one or both of two reasons.  
First, if he engages in bad behavior connected to his relapse, he can be fired because he 
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can be held to the same standards as other employees.  Second, in exchange for the 
reasonable accommodation of going to treatment, the alcoholic may have been forced to 
sign a last chance agreement in which he agrees to more stringent oversight than other 
employees.  Thus, whether he violates a work rule or not, he can be discharged merely 
for relapsing.   
Can the employer fire an employee simply because he is an alcoholic, if he has an 
impairment that does not significantly limit a major life activity?  Under the first prong of 
the disability definition, the employee is not presently disabled.  He cannot claim this 
protection of the Act, so the answer is yes.  This is hardly what Congress intended.   
Can such an alcoholic prove that he is has a record of a disability?  Even here, the 
courts have not been generous.  If he has been hospitalized for only a short time for his 
illness, many courts hold that he does not have a sufficient record of a disability.342 In 
addition, he must prove that he has a record of being substantially limited in a major life 
activity, which is also unlikely, except on the case of very poorly functioning alcoholics. 
If his employer fires him because he does not think an alcoholic can perform the 
job, can the employee show that he has been regarded as disabled?  Even if the employer 
believes that the alcoholic employee cannot do the job because of his alcoholism, the 
employee will still have to show that he is regarded as unable to perform in a range of 
jobs.343 As another author has suggested, there is a statutory directive to view “regarded 
as” from the employer’s perspective.  “The important role of stigma . . . suggests that an 
individual should also be protected under the ‘regarded as’ prong when he experiences 
discrimination on the basis of an (actual, past, or perceived) impairment that is ‘regarded’ 
by society in general as substantially limiting.”344 
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Even if the employee proves that he is regarded as disabled or has a record of a 
disability, he may not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation,345 so if he needs an 
accommodation to attend AA and/or therapy to stay sober, he is out of luck.  Thus, he 
may be unable to maintain his sobriety and will inevitably become worse.   
Using alcoholism as an example, it can be seen that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions have effectively eliminated from the application of the ADA at least one 
disability that Congress expressly intended to protect.  Obviously there are other 
conditions that the courts have decided are not legally disabling, although thought before 
to be so in every case, such as cancer.346 
The Court’s decisions limit the protected class to people who are traditionally 
disabled, such as people who are blind, deaf or unable to walk, because they are totally 
limited in a major life activity.  People with less obvious impairments, such as 
alcoholism, diabetes, back injuries, and mental illness generally may not be limited in a 
major life activity under the Court’s narrow interpretation of that term.  Nevertheless, 
these impairments cause these individuals to be substantially limited in life activities that 
may not be recognized because the courts do not think that such activities are central to a 
normal person’s daily life.347 
The unintended result of the Court’s decisions in the case of alcoholism is to 
provide protection only to some functional, but still very sick, active alcoholics who 
should be encouraged to enter recovery.  Once they are in recovery, they lose protection 
of the ADA and become subject to discipline or discharge, if they have to have the 
smallest accommodation to remain sober.  If they are unable to maintain their sobriety, 
they can be discharged for not measuring up to the employment requirements or for 
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violating a last chance agreement.  Surely this is not the result that Congress intended or 
that society would consider desirable.  In its zeal to limit the coverage the ADA, the 
Supreme Court is limiting the employment protection of the Act to people who cannot, or 
in the case of some active alcoholics, should not, be working.   
 Why have the courts interpreted the ADA so strictly that plaintiffs suing for 
employment discrimination under the ADA have to be so disabled that they probably 
cannot work anyway?348 One can only speculate.  One obvious possibility is that the 
Court is generally hostile to employment discrimination cases.349 
With regard to the ADA, there are some additional considerations.  There are two 
problems with regard to the conception of the statute.  One problem involves the structure 
of the Act, and the other involves the origin of this statute.  With regard to the structure of 
the Act, the ADA uses the same definition of disability for all categories of coverage, that 
the person is substantially limited in his ability to perform a major life activity.350 
Logically, protecting the rights of people who are seeking employment or trying to 
maintain employment involves different considerations from protecting rights of people 
denied access to public accommodations.  It can be argued that people who are denied 
access to public accommodations are more likely to be more impaired than people who 
are able to work.  The Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in this area and has 
indicated that it is reluctant to designate “working” as a major life activity,351 even 
though the Court has said that “reproduction” is.352 This somewhat schizoid treatment is 
reflected in the two cases decided discussed earlier under the ADA’s titles that govern 
areas other than employment.  In both of these cases, the Court was very generous in its 
interpretation of the Act.353 This may be some evidence of the Court’s hostility to 
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employment discrimination cases.354 To be more gracious, the problem may be that the 
ADA contains a conceptual problem, which requires disability to be viewed more, rather 
than less, stringently for the purposes of employment than disability for other purposes.  
The goal of Title I was to enable disabled people to work,355 not to put them in the 
dilemma of proving that they are sufficiently impaired to be disabled but still able to 
perform the essential duties of the job; in other words, that they are almost, but not quite, 
too sick to work.  However, the Act as written and interpreted allows that outcome. 
 The other problem is with regard to the origin of the ADA.  The ADA’s 
predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act, applied only to the federal government itself or to 
entities that consented to enter into a relationship with the federal government, federal 
grantees and federal contractors, all of whom were benefiting from the relationship.356 
One can only speculate that courts are limiting the ability of plaintiffs to proceed with a 
case out of fear of allowing juries to hear these sympathetic cases or to require the 
employer to prove undue hardship, which, according to the statute, could be onerous.357 
This reluctance may be due to the fact that, as opposed to the Rehabilitation Act, the 
defendant is not getting anything in exchange for making a reasonable accommodation 
that could be substantially burdensome.358 
In addition, as discussed above,359 some provisions of the Rehabilitation Act 
required federal contractors and the federal government to take affirmative action to 
employ the handicapped, as disabled people were termed then.360 There was a concern 
that the employer would have to employ people who could not perform the job, so the 
definition of one who is currently handicapped was intended to be stricter than for one 
who is discriminated against because he has a record of a disability or because he is 
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regarded as disabled.361 When the ADA was drafted, it simply used the Rehabilitation 
Act definitions, even though affirmative action was not required by any provision of the 
ADA.  Nevertheless, the courts did not interpret the Rehabilitation Act as strictly as the 
courts have been interpreting the ADA, despite Congress’ express prohibition that the 
ADA should not be interpreted less generously than the Rehabilitation Act.362 Judicial 
activism is, and has been, cutting in more than one direction lately.363 As one author 
concluded, after an empirical study on ADA litigation, 
[t]he most sobering hypothesis that emerges from this data is that the 
enactment of the ADA may have greatly harmed plaintiffs’ prospects 
under a related disability statute-the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  On the 
effective date of ADA Title I, Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases were faring twice as successfully as would ADA 
plaintiffs, over the next decade.364 
The solution is for the courts to recognize their obligation to follow the express 
intent of Congress and interpret the ADA as generously as they did the Rehabilitation 
Act.  How can this be accomplished at this point in time with the Supreme Court having 
boxed itself into a corner, so that few people are included in the protected class for 
employment purposes?  Without a legislative solution,365 which seems unlikely, the 
solution is to interpret the “regarded as” and “having a record of” provisions as Congress 
intended.366 In both, the employer assumes that the person cannot do the job because 
either he has a record of a disability or because the employer regards him as being 
disabled.  If courts follow the intent of Congress, these provisions should be interpreted 
more generously to prevent persons from being discriminated against because of 
perceived disabilities.  These are people who can work, but who are being discriminated 
against because the employer thinks they cannot perform the job.  Under the Sutton case, 
the Court adopted the EEOC’s definition of “working” as a major life activity, which 
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requires that the plaintiff be unable to perform a range of jobs.367 In the context of 
perceived disabilities, the definition works better than it would under the actual disability 
prong because there is no conflict with the employee being qualified to do the job, as 
there may be if the employee is claiming to be actually disabled.  If the employer believes 
that the employee cannot do his job and deals with him accordingly, then the employee 
should be considered substantially limited in the major life activity of working.368 As the 
court in Shiplett v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.369 said, if the employer believed 
that the employee could not be a train engineer, then he would be perceived as unable to 
do a number of safety sensitive jobs.370 In other words if the employer believes the 
employee cannot do the job, then the employer would also believe that the employee 
could not do other similar jobs.371 That should be enough to satisfy the Court’s 
requirement that the employee be perceived as unable to perform a range of jobs.372 
The question then arises, should people who are not actually disabled, but who are 
only regarded as or who have a record of a disability be entitled to reasonable 
accommodation?373 The answer should be a qualified yes.  While it may sound 
counterintuitive that a person who is not actually disabled would need a reasonable 
accommodation, there is no such limitation in the statute.  Reasonable accommodation 
applies to all three prongs of the disability definition.  Once the person qualifies for the 
protected class, the employer must reasonably accommodate any known physical or 
mental limitations.374 With the courts’ restrictive interpretation of who is disabled, 
reasonable accommodation becomes especially important.  This is particularly true in the 
case of people who are only able to work because they are using mitigating measures or 
require mitigating measures that may necessitate a reasonable accommodation, such as an 
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alcoholic who may require some time off to attend treatment, AA and/or counseling or a 
diabetic who needs breaks to check his glucose levels.375 
If reasonable accommodation were required for people who are only perceived as 
disabled or who have a record of a disability, the accommodations would in most cases 
not have to be as burdensome as accommodations for those who are actually disabled.  
This solution would relieve the courts of their fear that the employer would be severely 
burdened by reasonable accommodation because these accommodations should generally 
not be burdensome or the person could not be working. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
There is another obvious consideration.  Everything should not have to be 
justified in terms of economic efficiency.  The anti-discrimination acts did take into 
account the morality of discrimination in forbidding it.  Foreclosing disabled people from 
employment, even if it is justified in terms of economic efficiency, cannot be justified in 
terms of morality. Furthermore, “[t]here is a price—a cost—for securing more important 
remedial and social objectives.”376 
The courts have restricted the class of persons protected by the ADA to an 
unconscionably small number.  To rehabilitate the ADA, the courts must protect those 
employees who can now be discriminated against with impunity because employers 
believe incorrectly that their impairment prevents them from doing the job.  Until a 
legislative solution is feasible, the courts must accord the ADA its rightful place as a 
protector of impaired people who are not in fact too sick to work, but who can now 
legally be treated as if they were. 
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addiction and alcoholism are “physical or mental impairments” within 
meaning of section 7(6) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 
and the drug addicts and alcoholics are therefore handicapped for purposes 
of section 504 if their impairment substantially limits one of their major 
life activities.  The Secretary therefore believes that he without authority 
to exclude those conditions from the definition.  There is a medical and 
legal consensus that alcoholism and drug addiction are diseases, although 
there is disagreement as to whether they are primarily mental or physical.  
In addition, while enacting section 504, the committees that considered the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 were made aware of the Department’s long-
standing practice of treating addicts and alcoholics as handicapped 
individuals eligible for rehabilitation services under the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act.   
 
Also id. at 120 (“It is not possible to include in the legislation a list of all the 
specific conditions, diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or 
mental impairments . . . . The term includes, however, such conditions, diseases, 
and infections as:  . . .drug addiction, and alcoholism.) 
 
S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 106 (1989) (“[i]t is intended that rehabilitated alcoholics and 
drug users will be protected by the law.”);  
 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing before the House Committee on Small 
Business, 135th Cong. 39-41, 62 (1990) (Statement of Rep. Delay, Member, 
House Committee on Small Business) (“The intent of the ADA is to protect the disabled.  
The bill now covers more than 900 known disabilities.  This broad application includes 
drug addicts, alcoholics, people with contagious diseases and individuals with 
“voluntary” conditions such as being overweight.”) 
 
135 Cong. Rec. S11922-02, 77 (1989) (“Let me just say in conclusion to this that section 
504, which has been on the books since 1973, applies to many employers.  We have not 
had troubles with either the coverage of alcoholism or drug addiction under that law . . . 
.”) 
 
101 Cong. Rec. Sen. S10701, S10800 (1989) (“It is important to emphasize that we 
continue to protect applicants and employees who have overcome or are successfully 
being treated for drug or alcohol problems.  Retaining these crucial protections for 
persons who have recovered or are in treatment is consistent with our national drug 
strategy and our longstanding commitment to supporting the treatment of those with drug 
and alcohol problems and working to ensure the full reintegration of former drug and 
alcohol abusers into the working world.”) 
 
101 Cong. Rec. H2277, H2316 (1990) (“Those that are former drug addicts and 
alcoholics, even though they may be reformed, cannot be discriminated against.  They are 
considered disabled.”) 
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101 Cong. Rec. H2410, H2443 (1990) 
 
The bill excludes from protection individuals who are current drug users 
and it removes protections for current drug users under the Rehabilitation 
Act.  However, the bill explicitly retains protections for recovered persons, 
individuals who have successfully completed treatment, and persons 
currently in drug or alcohol treatment, who are not using drugs illegally.  
The bill also protects persons who are erroneously regarded as current 
illegal users of drugs . . . . This bill strikes a delicate balance.  It 
recognizes the need to protect employers, workers, and the public from 
persons whose current illegal drug use impairs their ability to perform a 
job and whose employment could result in serious harm to the lives or 
property of others.  At the same time, the bill recognizes that treatment for 
those in the grips of substance abuse is not only the compassionate thing 
to do but an essential component or a comprehensive attack on drugs.  
Treatment can save the lives of individual abusers, and it can also return 
them to productive roles in society, which strengthens our families, our 
communities, our economy, and ability to meet competitive challenges in 
the growing international marketplace.  By providing protections against 
discrimination for recovered substance abusers and those in treatment or 
recovery who are no longer engaged in illegal drug use, the bill provides 
an incentive for treatment.  
 
10 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2000).   
11 See ROSALYN CARSON-DEWITT, M.D., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DRUGS, ALCOHOL &
ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR 398 (2D ED. 1995). 
12 ADA preamble. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000). 
13 Employment rates for impaired people have actually declined since the ADA was 
enacted.  See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (2005). 
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(2), 791, 793, 794, 794(a) (2000)  
15 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).  The Rehabilitation Act still applies, but its standards are the 
ADA.  See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability 
Discrimination:  The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of 
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 428-30, (1997) for a discussion of the provisions of the 
Rehabilitation Act. 
16 See Susan Stefan, supra, note 7, at  271. “Defendants in Section 504 [of the 
Rehabilitation Act] cases rarely contested the issue of whether a plaintiff was 
handicapped under the Act [footnote omitted] . . .  Plaintiffs were found to be disabled 
under the Rehabilitation Act with conditions nearly identical to those presently being 
found by courts to not constitute disabilities under the ADA . . . .”  Id.  See also Colker, A
Windfall for Defendants, supra note 5, at 160; Kaiser, supra note 5, at 735. 
17 See infra Section III.B.
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18 See e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) and PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 
U.S.661 (2001).  See Waterstone, supra note 13, at 1838-42 for a discussion of non-
employment cases in which the plaintiff was treated more favorably than in employment 
cases. 
19 42 U.S.C. § 12112(6)(2000). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(2000). 
21 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638-39 (citing 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 CFR § 
41.31(b)(2) (1997)). 
22 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)(2000).  Under the ADA, the employer must provide the 
reasonable accommodation unless to do so would be an undue hardship.  42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(5)(A)(2000). 
23 See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 425-26. 
24 See infra Section IV.B. 
25 See Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving Disabilities”:  Why the Definition of Disability 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should be Revised to  Eliminate the Substantial 
Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L.REV. 83, 95 (2000). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).  See Samuel R. Bagenstros, Subordination, Stigma, 
and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 496 (2000). “The statutory ‘disability’ category 
should embrace those actual, past, and perceived impairments that subject people to 
systematic disadvantages in society.  And the concept of stigma should play an important 
evidentiary role.”  Id. at 445.  The author suggests that such impairments as HIV and 
epilepsy should be always be considered disabilities because of their stigmatizing effect, 
and that the agencies that administer the Act should be able to identify such impairments.  
Id. at 527.  Alcoholism should be included in such a list. 
27 See Bagenstros supra note 26, at 426. Even physicians have negative views about 
alcoholics.  Physicians often see alcoholism as a problem of willpower or conduct 
because of the lack of attention paid to the disease in medical schools.  See Thomas R. 
Hobbs, Ph.D., M.D., Managing alcoholism as a disease, Physician’s News Digest, (Feb. 
1998). 
28 See CARSON-DEWITT supra note 11, at 398. 
29 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (c)(4) provides in part as follows:   
 
(c) Authority of covered entity 
A covered entity-- 
(1) may prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use of alcohol at the 
workplace by all employees; 
(2) may require that employees shall not be under the influence of alcohol 
or be engaging in the illegal use of drugs at the workplace; 
(3) may require that employees behave in conformance with the 
requirements  
established under the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41 U.S.C. 701 et 
seq.); 
(4) may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an 
alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance 
and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory 
62
performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such 
employee. . . .  
30 See infra Section IV.B.2.a.1).  Even if he is in active addiction, courts more often than 
not find that even then there is no significant impairment of a major life activity.  Id. 
31 See David Olsky, Let Them Eat Cake: Diabetes and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act After Sutton, 52 STANFORD L. REV. 1829, 1847-48 (2000). 
32 In the case of alcoholics, these accommodations would include leave to go to 
treatment, AA meetings and/or counseling, and a second chance in the event of relapse.  
See infra Section IV.B.2.c. 
33 Cases usually end today with the court deciding that the plaintiff is not disabled, so 
whether he could perform the duties of the job generally does not arise.  See infra Section 
IV.B.2.a.2)-3).   
34 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
35 See infra IV. C. 2. a. 2)-3).
36 See infra Section IV. C. 2. c. 
37 As indeed they must under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611-2615 
(2000) but not under the ADA.  FMLA covers fewer employers than the ADA.  29 
U.S.C. § 2611 to 42 U.S.C. § 12111. The fact that intended beneficiaries of the ADA are 
protected by another statute is not a satisfactory solution. 
38 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS supra note 1, at 141-42.. 
39 Congress was concerned about the high unemployment rate among the disabled, which 
according to one survey was 39%.  See Olsky, supra note 31, at 1841. 
40 See Bagenstros, supra note 4, at 946-47.  See Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older 
Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. 
REV. 229, 238-40 (1990) in which the author discusses occasions when it may be 
economically rational to engage in prohibited classification of employees by protected 
class which are nevertheless prohibited by law. 
41 See Anderson, supra note 25, at 119-120. 
42 Id. at 119-20. 
43 See Arlene Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded As” Prong:  Giving Effect 
to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 592 (1997). In addition, the author notes 
that the Supreme Court recognized that “the ‘regarded as’ prong acknowledges that 
society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping 
as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.”  Id. (citing School 
Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 ( 1987)).    
44 Journal of the American Medical Association, Joint Committee of the National Council 
on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence and the American Society of Addiction Medicine. 
(1992) There are some dissident views regarding the disease concept of alcoholism.  See 
CARSON-DEWITT supra note .11. 
45 See BENJAMIN J. SADOCK & VIRGINIA A. SADOCK, 1 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF 
PHYCHIATRY 969 (7TH ED. 1999) 
46 See id. 
47 See id.   
48 See id. .
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49 See id.  “[R}ecovery is a process of trial and error; patients use slips when they occur 
to identify high-risk [for relapse] situations and to develop more appropriate coping 
techniques. “  Id.  
50 Smoking contributes to heart disease, as does being overweight.  Obesity is also an 
important factor in the development of diabetes.  See Russell Blaylock, HEALTH AND 
NUTRICIAN SECRETS THAT CAN SAVE YOUR LIFE 181, 220, 287-88 (2002).  
51 See, e.g., Hobbs supra note 27.  However, these attitudes may be changing.  “A recent 
Gallup poll found that almost 90 percent of Americans believe that alcoholism is a 
disease.”  Id. 
52 See id. at 958-59. 
One finding supporting the genetic conclusion is the threefold to fourfold 
in creased risk for severe alcoholic problems in close relatives of alcoholic 
persons.  . . . .The rate of similarity or concordance for severe alcohol-
related problems is significantly higher in identical twins of alcoholic 
individuals than in fraternal twins in most studies.  The adoption-type 
studies have all revealed a significantly enhanced risk for alcoholism the 
off-spring of alcoholic parents, even when the children have been 
separated from their biological parents close to birth and raised without 
any knowledge of the problems within the biological family.   
Id.  
53 
[Thirty] percent or more of drinkers develop temporary alcohol-related life 
problems.  Severe, repetitive alcohol-related life impairment (i.e. alcohol 
dependence) is observed at some time during the lives of approximately 
10 percent of men and 3 to 5 percent of women, with an additional 5 to 10 
percent of each sex developing persistent but less intense alcohol-related 
life problems that are diagnosed as abuse.  Because high levels of alcohol 
intake can cause diverse medical and psychiatric problems, it has been 
estimated that 20 to 35 percent of people seeking help from a health care 
provider have alcohol abuse or dependence.  Thus, alcohol-related 
problems are very common in society.   
 
Id. at 954. 
54 Id. at 958. 
55 
The common perception of alcohol and drug addiction as self-inflicted 
conditions accounts in large part for the social stigma that attaches to 
them. . . .The perception is largely unjust; addiction is a disease with a 
documented biological mechanism.  Tendencies toward addiction may 
also have a genetic component, which further undercuts the idea of 
voluntariness. . . . [T]he instinct to blame the addict seems particularly 
arbitrary and unfair. . . . The underlying hypocrisy behind the blame-the-
addict approach is most apparent with respect to alcohol, a product that is 
used openly and without shame by most adult Americans.  The stigma of 
addiction thus does not attach merely to the behaviors giving rise to the 
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illness, but to the illness itself. The alcoholic is viewed in some way as 
weak—that is, not capable of “handling” a substance that so many others 
have the ability to enjoy casually.   
Sonja B. Starr, Simple Fairness: Ending Discrimination in Health Insurance 
Coverage of Addiction Treatment, 111 YALE L.J. 2321, 2335-2337 (2002). 
56 Id.  “[T]he stereotypical alcoholic person who is a homeless bum is very much the 
exception rather than the rule, representing only 5 percent of all persons with severe, 
recurring alcohol-related difficulties.”  Id.. at 954. 
57 Id. 
58 Alcoholics may be better off asking for a reasonable accommodation under Title VII.  
Ironically, reasonable accommodation under the religion provisions of Title VII was 
specifically referred to in the ADA as not sufficiently generous to use as an analogy for 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA.  See infra note 85.  However, because of the 
difficulties of proving a case under the ADA, an alcoholic plaintiff might be better off 
asking for an accommodation to attend AA meetings under Title VII.  While AA is a 
spiritual, not a religious program, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note at 44-57. its 
belief in a power greater than oneself would qualify it as a religion under Title VII.  See 
C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2006) (religious practices include”moral or ethical beliefs as to what is 
right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious 
views.”) 
59 See supra text accompanying note 49.   
60 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2000). 
61 See infra notes 203-04. 
62 42 U.S.C. § 12101.  
63 Id.  
64 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(2), 791, 793, 794, 794(a) (2000). 
65 See Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law As a Model for Amending the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 597, 607-610 (2004). 
66 See id. at 604; FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER supra note 2, at 793. 
67 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.   
68 See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 2, at 793 (5TH ED. 2001). 
69 Compare 42 U.S.C. 2000e (b) (2000) with ADA 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5).  
70 42 U.S.C. § 12102(8).  The section provides as follows:   
 
(8) Qualified individual with a disability 
 
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with 
a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform 
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual 
holds or desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall 
be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are 
essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before 
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be 
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job. 
 
65
71 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2000).  The provision reads as follows:   
 
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-- 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of the major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
 
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.   
73 Compare 42 U.S.C. 2000e 2(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a). 
74 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d)(2)(2000). 
75 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(2000).  A pre-employment physical examination may only be 
conducted after the employer has made an offer of employment and only if all employees 
are required to take a physical.  The provision imposes other restrictions on how the 
information is used. 
76 42 U.S.C. § 12114(d)(2000) provides that a drug test “to determine illegal use of drugs 
is not a medical examination.” 
77 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)(2000). 
78 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b) (1)(2000). 
79 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b) (6)(2000). 
80 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (a)(2000). 
81 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.   
82 The Court has interpreted the reasonable accommodation requirement for religion to 
be minimal.  See infra note 85.
83 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). 
84 Id. 
The term”reasonable accommodation” may include— 
 (A)  making existing facilities used by employees readily 
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and 
 (B)  job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of 
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified 




85 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).  (B) Factors to be considered 
 
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include-- 
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; 
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in 
the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons 
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employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the 
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the 
facility; 
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of 
the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its 
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and 
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the 
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the 
geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the 
facility or facilities in question to the covered entity. 
 
Also in common with Title VII, the ADA has a defense for a religious employer in hiring 
persons of a particular religion.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (c) with Title VII.  
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (c) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
85 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) Title VII also has a requirement that the employer 
reasonably accommodate the religious practices of employees.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
The requirement for reasonable accommodation under the ADA, however, was intended 
to be more difficult to achieve.  See US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 422 (2002) 
(Ginsberg, J. dissenting) for a discussion of the difference in interpretation.  “The 
legislative history also specifically rules out the majority’s reliance on Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison . . . . “  (citing “H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68, U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News 1990, pp. 303, 350 (‘The Committee wishes to make it lcdar that 
the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison are not applicable to 
this legislation.’); S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 35 (same).”  Id.  TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 
(1977) is a Title VII case interpreting reasonable accommodation under that statute.   The 
dissent in US Airways went on to say that the “House Report singles out Hardison’s 
equation of ‘undue hardship’ and anything more than a ‘de minimus [sic] cost’ as being 
inapplicable to the ADA.”   Id. at n.2.   
87 The Supreme Court has nevertheless interpreted the ADA to provide a bona fide 
seniority defense in U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).  
88 42 U.S.C, § 2000-e-2(e) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).  The BFOQ defense 
under Title VII only applies to sex, religious and national origin discrimination.  § 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).  Race discrimination cannot be defended as a BFOQ.  See 
Harris v. Offshore Services, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (J. Ginsburg concurring).  
There are other defenses under Title VII that are not contained in the ADA as 
well, such as action taken pursuant to a merit system or a system which measures 
quantity or quality of production or a professionally developed test.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (1988). 
89 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).  In addition, an employer may refuse to employ one with certain 
infectious diseases in food handling occupations.  42 U.S.C. § 12113(d). 
90 42 U.S.C. § 12209 (5) Enforcement of employment rights 
 
The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000e-16 of this title 
shall be available to any employee of an instrumentality of the Congress 
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who alleges a violation of the rights and protections under sections 12112 
through 12114 of this title that are made applicable by this section, except 
that the authorities of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
shall be exercised by the chief official of the instrumentality of the 
Congress. 
 
The ADA also provides as follows: 
 
(b) Coordination 
The agencies with enforcement authority for actions which allege 
employment discrimination under this subchapter and under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.] shall develop 
procedures to ensure that administrative complaints filed under this 
subchapter and under the  
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are dealt with in a manner that avoids 
duplication of effort and prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting 
standards for the same requirements under this subchapter and the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Commission, the Attorney General, and 
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs shall establish such 
coordinating mechanisms (similar to provisions contained in the joint 
regulations promulgated by the Commission and the Attorney General at 
part 42 of title 28 and part 1691 of title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, 
and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs dated January 16, 1981 
(46 Fed.Reg. 7435, January 23, 1981)) in regulations implementing this 
subchapter and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 not later than 18 months after 
July 26, 1990. 
 
91 42 U.S.C § 1981a (2000) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(a) Right of recovery 
(1) Civil rights 
. . . .
(2) Disability 
In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers, remedies, 
and procedures set forth in section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-5 or 2000e-16] (as provided in section 107(a) 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)), and 
section 794a(a)(1) of Title 29, respectively) against a respondent who 
engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment 
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) under section 791 
of Title 29 and the regulations implementing section 791 of Title 29, or 
who violated the requirements of section 791 of Title 29 or the regulations 
implementing section 791 of Title 29 concerning the provision of a 
reasonable accommodation, or section 102 of the Americans with 
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Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12112), or committed a violation of 
section 102(b)(5) of the Act, against an individual, the complaining party 
may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection 
(b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent. 
(3) Reasonable accommodation and good faith effort 
In cases where a discriminatory practice involves the provision of a 
reasonable accommodation pursuant to section 102(b)(5) of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)] or regulations 
implementing section 791 of Title 29, damages may not be awarded under 
this section where the covered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in 
consultation with the person with the disability who has informed the 
covered entity that accommodation is needed, to identify and make a 
reasonable accommodation that would provide such individual with an 
equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on 
the operation of the business. 
(b) Compensatory and punitive damages 
(1) Determination of punitive damages 
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section 
against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or 
political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the 
respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory 
practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally 
protected rights of an aggrieved individual. 
(2) Exclusions from compensatory damages 
Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include 
backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under 
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)]. 
(3) Limitations 
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this 
section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other 
nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under 
this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party-- 
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year, $50,000; 
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201 
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year, $100,000; and 
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year, $200,000; and 
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(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each 
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, 
$300,000. 
(4) Construction 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the scope of, or the relief 
available under, section 1981 of this title. 
(c) Jury trial 
If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this 
section-- 
(1) any party may demand a trial by jury; and 
(2) the court shall not inform the jury of the limitations described in 
subsection (b)(3) of this section. 
(d) Definitions 
As used in this section: 
(1) Complaining party 
The term "complaining party" means-- 
(A) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under subsection 
(a)(1) of this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
the Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or proceeding 
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); 
or 
(B) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under subsection 
(a)(2) of this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
the Attorney General, a person who may bring an action or proceeding 
under section 794a(a)(1) of Title 29, or a person who may bring an action 
or proceeding under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
[42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 et seq.]. 
(2) Discriminatory practice 
The term "discriminatory practice" means the discrimination described in 
paragraph (1), or the discrimination or the violation described in paragraph 
(2), of subsection  
 
92 42 U.S.C. 1981a(3). 
93 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) provides: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall 
be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under 
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the 
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title. 
 
94 See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S.661 (2001) and Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 
624 (1998). 
95 524 U.S. 624 (1998)(the case involved a dentist who offered to treat the patient in a 
hospital, but not in his office). 
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96 The regulations referred to were promulgated by the HEW because this was a public 
accommodation case, not an employment case.  524 U.S. at 632.  The EEOC regulations 
in this regard are identical.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). 
The Court quoted the regs and commented as follows: 
 
“A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: 
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including 
speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; 
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or  
"(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, 
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning 
disabilities." 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997). 
In issuing these regulations, HEW decided against including a list 
of disorders constituting physical or mental impairments, out of concern 
that any specific enumeration might not be comprehensive. 42 Fed.Reg. 
22685 (1977), reprinted in 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, p. 334 (1997). The 
commentary accompanying the regulations, however, contains a 
representative list of disorders and conditions constituting physical 
impairments, including "such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, 
visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, 
muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, 
mental retardation, emotional illness, and ... drug addiction and 
alcoholism." Ibid. 
524 U.S. at 632-33. 
97 524 U.S. 633-634. 
98 524 U.S. at 638-39 (citing 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 CFR § 41.31(b)(2) (1997)   
The dissent disagreed that reproduction is a major life activity, but agreed that this list is 
incorporated by reference into the ADA.  524 U.S. at 659 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).   
99 524 U..S. at 639. 
100 The EEOC regulations have a definition of substantially limited, however.  29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(ii) (2000). 
101 524 U.S. 642-645.  The Court said: 
 
We find the uniformity of the administrative and judicial precedent 
construing the definition significant. When administrative and judicial 
interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, 
repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general 
matter, the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial 
interpretations as well. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580- 
581, 98 S.Ct. 866, 869-870, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). The uniform body of 
administrative and judicial precedent confirms the conclusion we reach 
today as the most faithful way to effect the congressional design. 
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102 The ADA also requires that in order to be covered by the ADA, the person not pose a 
direct threat.  The Court ultimately decided that whether the plaintiff posed a direct threat 
must be decided based on objective reasonableness, not the health care professional’s 
subjective judgment.  To make this determination, the Court remanded for more 
conclusive evidence.  Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649. 
103 524 U.S. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part); 524 U.S. at 664-65 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part.) In Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999), the Court cited Bragdon 
to support its adoption of a strict individualized test:   
The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated 
"with respect to an individual" and be determined based on whether an 
impairment substantially limits the "major life activities of such 
individual." § 12102(2). Thus, whether a person has a disability under the 
ADA is an individualized inquiry. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 
641-642, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (declining to consider 
whether HIV infection is a per se disability under the ADA). 
104 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
105 527 U.S. at 477-78.  For an interesting view on how the Court crafted the decision, see 
Mark C. Rahdert, Arline’s Ghost:  Some Notes on Working as a Major Life Activity under 
the ADA,  9 TEMPLE POL. & C.R. L. REV. 303 (2000). 
106 527 U.S. at 481.  This statement seems to contradict Bragdon v. Abbott, in which the 
Court noted that the Act required it to construe the ADA according to the HEW 
regulations defining disability.  See supra discussion accompanying note 96. See Lisa 
Eichhorn, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep:  Dancing Around the EEOC’s 
“Disability” Regulations under the ADA, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 177 (2004) for a good 
discussion of the issue of the deference owed to the EEOC regulations under the ADA. 
107 527 U.S. at 478 (citing § 12102(2))  
108 527 U.S.at 481. 
109 Id. 
110 527 U.S. at 482-83.  The Court made this determination by using three provisions of 
the ADA: 
 
[1]  The Act defines a "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of an 
individual. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis added). Because the phrase 
"substantially limits" appears in the Act in the present indicative verb 
form, we think the language is properly read as requiring that a person be 
presently--not potentially or hypothetically--substantially limited in order 
to demonstrate a disability. A "disability" exists only where an impairment 
"substantially limits" a major life activity, not where it "might," "could," 
or "would" be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken. 
A person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication 
or other measures does not have an impairment that presently 
"substantially limits" a major life activity. 
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[2]  The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated 
"with respect to an individual" and be determined based on whether an 
impairment substantially limits the "major life activities of such 
individual.". . .The agency guidelines' directive that persons be judged in 
their uncorrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to the 
individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA. The agency approach would 
often require courts and employers to speculate about a person's condition 
and would, in many cases, force them to make a disability determination 
based on general information about how an uncorrected impairment 
usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual's actual condition. 
 . . . .  
[3]  Congress found that “some 43 million Americans have one or more 
physical or mental disabilities” . . . Had Congress intended to include all 
persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the 
Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of disabled 
persons in the findings. That it did not is evidence that the ADA's 
coverage is restricted to only those whose impairments are not mitigated 
by corrective measures. 
Id. 
111 527 U.S. at 489.  It should be noted that the Court had said earlier that the EEOC did 
not have authority to issue the regulations.  Id. at 481.  At this point, the guidance suited 
the Court’s purpose, so it was assumed without deciding that they were valid.  Id. at 492-
93. 
112 527 U.S. at 481. 
113 Id. (citing § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).  The Court further noted: 
 
The EEOC further identifies several factors that courts should consider 
when determining whether an individual is  substantially limited in the 
major life activity of working. including the geographical area to which 
the individual has reasonable access, and "the number and types of jobs 
utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within the 
geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified." §§ 
1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A), (B). To be substantially limited in the major life 
activity of working, then, one must be precluded from more than one type 
of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an 
individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, 
one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of 
different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad 
range of jobs. 
 
527 U.S. at 491-92. 
114 527 U.S. at 493. 
115 527 U.S. at 492. 
116 Id.  
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117 See Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002). 
118 See supra text accompanying note 96.  In addition, “working” was also included in the 
list of major life activities from the Senate and House Committee reports on the ADA.  
See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 439. 
119 Bagenstros, supra note 26, at 505.  Working is “‘a means of proving yourself worthy 
in your own eyes and in the eyes of others’ . . . . People who cannot work because of their 
impairments are therefore likely to experience prejudice and neglect.”  Id. at  506. 
120 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202.   
121 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
122 “The ADA expressly incorporates the regulations the Executive Branch had 
previously promulgated to implement the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  [citing, inter alia, 
42 U.S.C. section 12201(a) (1994)]  Even if the regulations promulgated under the ADA 
were not themselves entitled to deference, therefore, the Court has made clear that the 
substantively identical regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation act would 
nonetheless provide a floor below which the ADA’s coverage could not drop.”  
Bagenstros, supra note 26, at 409-10.   
123 “The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated "with 
respect to an individual" and be determined based on whether an impairment 
substantially limits the "major life activities of such individual." § 12102(2). 
Thus, whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized 
inquiry. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-642, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 
L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (declining to consider whether HIV infection is a per se 
disability under the ADA).”  527 U.S. at 483. 
124 See supra discussion accompanying notes 101-103. 
125 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642. 
126 527 U.S. at 495-513 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
127 527 U.S. at 482-83.  “The Court majority can be criticized for overrelying on an 
estimate of the number of people with disabilities, an estimate whose validity was 
questioned by its own sources.  [footnote omitted]  Congress’s reference to 43 million 
individuals with disabilities should be seen as a signal of inclusion, not exclusion.”  
Anderson, supra note 25, at 107. In addition, the 43 million figure was derived from 
sources that define disability differently from the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.  See 
Lisa Eichhorn, Applying The ADA To Mitigating Measures Cases:  A Case of Statutory 
Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071, 1113 (1999). 
128 527 U.S. at 513-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
129 527 U.S. at 503-04. 
130 The third case decided along with Sutton was Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527
U.S. 516 (1999) in which the court affirmed the lower court that the plaintiff was not 
disabled by hypertension because of mitigating measures.  In addition, the Court 
reiterated the holding in Sutton that to be “regarded as disabled” in the major life activity 
of working, the plaintiff would have be foreclosed from a range of jobs.  In this case, the 
plaintiff was regarded as unable to perform a mechanics’ job that also required driving a 
commercial vehicle, but  he could perform other mechanic’s jobs. 
131 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
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132 527 U.S. at 558-559. 
133 The Act allows employers to rely on governmental requirements.  See infra note 191. 
134 527 U.S. at 560. 
135 527 U.S. at 558-59. 
136 527 U.S. at 575-76. 
137 527 U.S. at 564-67. 
138 527 U.S. at 564 [emphasis added] (citing Kirkingburg v. Albertson’s, Inc., 143 F.3d 
1228 (9th Cir. 1998).  The Supreme Court said that the lower court had cited the EEOC 
definition of "substantially limits" which requires a “significant restriction as to the 
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major 
life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average 
person in the general  population can perform that same major life activity."  527 U.S. at 
563-64 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii)).  The lower court had also said that 
“Kirkingburg’s inability to see out of one eye affects his peripheral visions and his depth 
perception.  Although his brain has developed subconscious mechanisms for coping with 
this visual impairment and thus his body compensate for his disability, the manner in 
which he sees differs significantly from the manner in which most people see.”  143 F.3d 
at 1232. 
139 527 U.S. at 565.  
140 527 U.S. at 565-66. 
141 527 U.S. at 566.  The Court said “That category, as we understand it, may embrace a 
group whose members vary by the degree of visual acuity in the weaker eye, the age at 
which they suffered their vision loss, the extent of their compensating adjustments in 
visual techniques, and the ultimate scope of the restrictions on their visual abilities. These 
variables are not the stuff of a per se rule. While monocularity inevitably leads to some 
loss of horizontal field of vision and depth perception, [footnote omitted] consequences 
the Ninth Circuit mentioned, [citation omitted] the court did not identify the degree of 
loss suffered by Kirkingburg, nor are we aware of any evidence in the record specifying 
the extent of his visual restrictions.  527 U.S. at 566-67.   
142 527 U.S. at 567. 
143 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
144 534 U.S. at 187-190.  The parties disagree about how this came about.  The plaintiff 
alleges that she was forced to continue doing the duties that caused her condition to 
worsen.  The defendant contends that she started missing work and was fired for poor 
attendance.  534 U.S. at 189-90. 
145 534 U.S. at 191. 
146 534 U.S. at 192.  The Court expressed no opinion on whether working, lifting, and 
other life activities preserved for appeal below were major life activities. 
147 534 U.S. at 197.  See supra note 127.   
148 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481. 
149 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 [emphasis added].   
150 534 U.S. at 202. 
151 Id.  See supra discussion accompanying note 89.  See Curtis D. Edmonds, Snakes and 
Ladders:  Expanding the Definition of “Major Life Activity” in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 33 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 321, 325 (2002), for a good discussion of how 
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restrictively the courts are interpreting major life activity and Eichhorn supra note 106 
for a discussion of the how the Court’s failure to defer properly to EEOC regulations and 
guidelines caused it to adopt a much more restrictive view of “substantially limited.”   
152 536 U.S. 73 (2002) 
153 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). 
154 42 U.S.C. §12113(b). 
155 536 U.S. at 78-79. 
156 536 U.S. at  79-87.  See Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major 
Life Activities:  The Failure of the “Disability Definition in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1417-18 (1999) and Bagenstros, supra 
note 4, at 933 for discussions of the disability movement’s concern regarding 
paternalism.   
157 Compare the Court’s treatment of the EEOC’s regulations with regard to working in 
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 with the Court’s treatment of the EEOC guidances with regard to 
mitigating measures Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83.
158 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 
159 540 U.S. at 54-55. 
160 Id. 
161 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Legitimate non-discriminatory 
reason is a judicially-created defense to a disparate treatment case that the Court 
developed under Title VII.  Because Congress provided little guidance for analyzing a 
circumstantial evidence case of disparate treatment under Title VII, See Judith J. Johnson, 
Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Resuscitate the Reasonable 
Factors Other than Age” Defense and the Disparate Impact Theory, 55 HASTINGS L. 
REV. (2004), the Court developed the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason defense as the 
model of proof for disparate treatment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973).  In establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that 1) he was a 
member of a protected class; 2) he applied and was qualified for a position for which the 
employer was seeking applicants; 3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and 4) the 
employer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff’s qualifications.  Id. at 802.  
Once the employer produces evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the court that the reason given by the employer 
was not the true reason for the employer’s action, but rather was a pretext for 
discrimination.  St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514–15 (1993).  In that case, 
the Court said that the trier of fact may resolve the ultimate issue of discrimination vel non 
based on its disbelief of the employer’s reason for its action, but that such disbelief does not 
necessarily satisfy the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proving discrimination. Id. The plaintiff 
must prove not only that the employer’s reasons were untrue, but that they were a pretext for 
discrimination. Id. at 514–15. 
162 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993). 
163 See supra discussion accompanying notes 77-79. 
164 The lower court was correct in holding that because the no re-hire policy screened out 
former drug addicts, who are protected under the act, the no-hire policy could not be a 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason.  536 U.S. at 518.  The Supreme Court reiterated its 
previously stated conclusion that legitimate non-discriminatory reason means any reason 
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that does not discriminate on its face; thus a neutral policy will always serve as a defense.  
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (a case decided under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, in which the Court noted that a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason or a “factor other than age” can be any reason, regardless of 
how improper or illegal, as long as it does not violate the particular act under which the 
plaintiff is suing.  Id. at 610-11.)  The defendant’s neutral policy in the Raytheon case was 
thus a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that the plaintiff must prove is a pretext for 
discrimination.  Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 520.   
165 536 U.S. at 519. The district court had characterized the plaintiff’s attack on the 
employer’s employment policy as based on the disparate impact theory and foreclosed 
the argument because of timeliness.  In fact, the defendant had not interposed the neutral 
employment policy as the reason for its action until later in discovery, at which time the 
court would not allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint and allege disparate impact.  
Id. at 517.  The Supreme Court developed the disparate impact theory under Title VII in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), to preclude the use of neutral practices 
and procedures that disproportionately impact the protected class.  Id. at 430.  Such 
practices can be defended if the defendant can prove that they are job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.  See Johnson, supra note 161, at 1410 for a discussion 
of disparate impact under Title VII.  Unlike the model of proof for disparate treatment, 
however, the model of proof for disparate impact is codified in the ADA.  42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(6)(2000). 
On remand, the court decided that there was enough for a jury to believe that the 
employer was discriminating based on the plaintiff’s alcoholism and not because of a 
neutral policy.  Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., 362 F.3d 564 (2004).   
166 See Michelle T. Friedland, Not Disabled Enough:  The ADA’s “Major Life Activity” 
Definition of Disability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 171, 173-76 (1999) 
167 42 U.S.C. § 12102(8)(2000). 
168 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6)(2000). 
169 This is a fairly critical limitation because the employer bears the burden of justifying 
his employment policies.  The Court seems to indicate that the employer only bears this 
burden, if the case is classified as a disparate impact case.  If, as here, the plaintiff 
contends that he was discriminated against because of his disability, and the defendant 
contends that he used a neutral employment policy, the burden of persuasion should not 
remain on the plaintiff to prove that the policy is a pretext for discrimination, rather the 
burden should shift to the defendant to defend the policy.  It should be noted that in 
Chevron v.Echazabel, 536 U.S. 73 (2002), the Court did not limit to a charge of disparate 
impact the defense of proving that the employee posed a direct threat.  For a discussion of 
this case, see text accompanying notes 152-57. 
What should the plaintiff have done in this case?  He could have amended his 
complaint, if he had known in time that the defendant was relying on a neutral policy.  If 
he had relied on alternate theories and his case had been characterized as disparate 
impact, he would have lost his right to recover damages, which are available only in 
disparate treatment cases.  See supra note 91.  Traveling only under the disparate 
treatment theory, the plaintiff would have lost, if the employer had shown that the policy 
was not a pretext for discrimination, even though the employer is expressly foreclosed by 
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the ADA from having such a policy.  On remand, the lower court decided that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was discriminated against on the 
basis of his addiction.  Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., 362 F.3d 564, 568-69 
(2004). 
170 536 U.S. 73 (2002).   
171 532 U.S. 661 (2001).  
172 532 U.S. at 666-671. 
173 532 U.S. at 682. 
174 See Waterstone, supra note 13, at 1841.  In Southeastern Community College v. 
Davis,  442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979), the Supreme Court said that making a fundamental 
alteration is an undue hardship.  Also, the EEOC guidance provides that “‘[u]ndue 
hardship” refers to any accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, 
substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature of the business or
operation.”  29 CFR 1630.2(p) (2006)(emphasis added). 
175 532 U.S. at 683-85. 
176 532 U.S. at 688. 
177 532 U.S. at 690.  The dissent is interesting:   
 
If one assumes, however, that the PGA TOUR has some legal 
obligation to play classic, Platonic golf. . . . then we as Justices must 
confront what is indeed an awesome responsibility. . . . It has been 
rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United States . . . to 
decide What is Golf.  I am sure that the Framers of the Constitution, aware 
of the 1457 edict of James II of Scotland prohibiting golf because it 
interfered with the practice of archery, fully expected that sooner or later 
the paths of golf and government, the law and the links, would once again 
cross and that the judges of this august Court would some day have to 
wrestle with that age-old jurisprudential question . . . :  Is someone riding 
around a golf course from shot to shot really a golfer? . . . . 
Either out of humility or out of self respect (one or the other) the Court should 
decline to answer this incredibly difficult or incredibly silly question. 
 
532 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
178 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
179 The Court said that whether collectively bargained or unilaterally imposed by the 
employer, seniority systems provide “important employee benefits by creating, and 
fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment.”  The Court said lastly that 
the most important consideration was that if the employer were to have to justify its 
seniority system in the usual case that that in itself would undermine employee 
expectations.  The Court did leave open the possibility that if the seniority system was not 
administered in such a way as to raise employee expectations, then there could be special 
circumstances in which a violation of the seniority system would be a reasonable 
accommodation.  535 U. S. at 404-05. 
The case had a promising beginning; the Court began by rejecting the employer’s 
argument that a reasonable accommodation does not require the employer to provide 
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preferential treatment to a disabled employee.  The Court said that the Act does require 
that a disabled employee be treated preferentially to be able to perform; thus, the 
employer may be required to make exceptions to neutral rules for a disabled employee, 
and such exemptions are not per se unreasonable accommodations.  535 U.S. at 397-98. 
The Court, however, singled out a seniority system for special treatment.  The Court said 
that in the usual case, overriding the seniority system would not be a reasonable 
accommodation.  The Court cited several bases for its decision.  First, the Court cited 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison 432 U.S. 63 (1977) for the proposition that under 
Title VII, an exemption from a seniority system is never a reasonable accommodation.  
However, as the dissent points out, Title VII contains the express defense of bona fide 
seniority system, while the ADA chose not to include such a defense.  Furthermore, as 
the dissent notes that the legislative history makes it clear that the Hardison was not to 
serve as precedent for undue hardship under the ADA.  535 U.S. at 421-423 (Souter, J., 
dissenting).  As further justification for its decision, the Court then cited lower court 
holdings under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA that collectively bargained seniority 
systems could not be overridden to provide a reasonable accommodation.  535 U.S. at 
404.  As the dissent also points out, this ignores legislative history to the contrary, that 
seniority systems would only be a factor in whether the accommodation was reasonable.  
Id. at 421.   
180 535 U.S. at 399-401.   
181 535 U. S. at 402-403. 
182 See infra Section IV.B.2. 
183 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(2000). 
184 The regulations referred to were promulgated by the HEW because this was a public 
accommodation case, not an employment case.  Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 632.  The 
EEOC regulations in this regard are identical.  See supra note 96.  The Court in Bragdon 
quoted the regulations and commented as follows: 
 
“A) any physiological disorder or condition, any physiological disorder or 
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or 
more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; 
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; 
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and 
endocrine; or  
"(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, 
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning 
disabilities." 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997). 
In issuing these regulations, HEW decided against including a list 
of disorders constituting physical or mental impairments, out of concern 
that any specific enumeration might not be comprehensive. 42 Fed.Reg. 
22685 (1977), reprinted in 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, p. 334 (1997). The 
commentary accompanying the regulations, however, contains a 
representative list of disorders and conditions constituting physical 
impairments, including "such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, 
visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, 
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muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, 
mental retardation, emotional illness, and ... drug addiction and 
alcoholism." Ibid. 
524 U.S. at 632-33. 
185 See Hobbs supra note 27. 
186 Congress included specific provisions in the ADA regarding alcohol and drug addicts.  
See supra note 29 and infra note 188.  From these provisions, it can be seen that 
Congress was assuming that alcoholics and drug addicts would be covered and made 
special provisions for them, clearly wanting to protect those who were in recovery. 
187 See infra notes 203-04. 
188 See Reese John Henderson, Jr., Addiction as Disability:  The Protection of Alcoholics 
and Drug Addicts under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 44 VANDERBILT L. 
REV. 713 (1991) for a discussion of the origin of the distinction. 
 
The definition of disability excludes one who is currently using illegal drugs.  42 U.S.C. 
§12114 provides as follows:   
 
For purposes of this subchapter, the term "qualified individual with a 
disability" shall not include any employee or applicant who is currently 
engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the 
basis of such use. 
(b) Rules of construction 
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to exclude as a 
qualified individual with a disability an individual who-- 
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program 
and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been 
rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use; 
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer 
engaging in such use; or 
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in 
such use; 
except that it shall not be a violation of this chapter for a covered entity to 
adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not 
limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual described in 
paragraph (1) or (2) is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs. 
(c) Authority of covered entity 
A covered entity-- 
(1) may prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use of alcohol at the 
workplace by all employees; 
(2) may require that employees shall not be under the influence of alcohol 
or be engaging in the illegal use of drugs at the workplace; 
(3) may require that employees behave in conformance with the 
requirements  
established under the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41 U.S.C. 701 et 
seq.); 
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(4) may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who 
is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job 
performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if 
any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug use or 
alcoholism of such employee; and 
(5) may, with respect to Federal regulations regarding alcohol and the 
illegal use of drugs, require that-- 
(A) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations 
of the Department of Defense, if the employees of the covered entity are 
employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including complying 
with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in 
such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are 
employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the 
Department of Defense); 
(B) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations 
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, if the employees of the covered 
entity are employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including 
complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive 
positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered 
entity who are employed in  
such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission); and 
(C) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations 
of the Department of Transportation, if the employees of the covered 
entity are employed in a transportation industry subject to such 
regulations, including complying with such regulations (if any) that apply 
to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of 
employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as 
defined in the regulations of the Department of Transportation). 
(d) Drug testing 
(1) In general 
For purposes of this subchapter, a test to determine the illegal use of drugs 
shall not be considered a medical examination. 
(2) Construction 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, or 
authorize the conducting of drug testing for the illegal use of drugs by job 
applicants or employees or making employment decisions based on such 
test results. 
(e) Transportation employees 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, 
restrict, or authorize the otherwise lawful exercise by entities subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation of authority to-- 
(1) test employees of such entities in, and applicants for, positions 
involving safety-sensitive duties for the illegal use of drugs and for on-
duty impairment by alcohol; and 
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(2) remove such persons who test positive for illegal use of drugs and on-
duty impairment by alcohol pursuant to paragraph (1) from safety-
sensitive duties in implementing subsection (c) of this section. 
 
189 42 U.S.C. §12114(b)(2000). The courts are being hard on the addict in this regard 
also.  For example, in Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2001), the 
plaintiff was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants and required to 
participate in a treatment program.  Her employer fired her for her absence during the 
treatment program.  The court said that she was not entitled to the safe harbor provision 
of the ADA that extends protection to employees who are participating in a treatment and 
are no longer using drugs.  The court held the provision only applies to employees who 
have refrained from using drugs for a significant period of time.  Thus, under this 
interpretation, the safe harbor provision will never apply.   
190 42 U.S.C. §12113(c)(2000). 
191 The ADA allows drug testing of applicants, which is not forbidden as a medical 
examination.  Furthermore, the ADA provides that 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, or authorize the 
conducting of drug testing for the illegal use of drugs by job applicants or employees or 
making employment decisions based on such test results. 
 
There are other provisions regarding compliance with various other federal laws and 
regulations.   
(5) may, with respect to Federal regulations regarding alcohol and the 
illegal use of drugs, require that-- 
(A) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations 
of the Department of Defense, if the employees of the covered entity are 
employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including complying 
with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in 
such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are 
employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the 
Department of Defense); 
(B) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations 
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, if the employees of the covered 
entity are employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including 
complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive 
positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered 
entity who are employed in  
such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission); and 
(C) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations 
of the Department of Transportation, if the employees of the covered 
entity are employed in a transportation industry subject to such 
regulations, including complying with such regulations (if any) that apply 
to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of 
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employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as 
defined in the regulations of the Department of Transportation). 
42 U.S.C. § 12114(c). 
 
Furthermore, the Act provides:  
 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, 
restrict, or authorize the otherwise lawful exercise by entities subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation of authority to-- 
 
(1) test employees of such entities in, and applicants for, positions 
involving safety-sensitive duties for the illegal use of drugs and for on-
duty impairment by alcohol; and 
(2) remove such persons who test positive for illegal use of drugs and on-
duty impairment by alcohol pursuant to paragraph (1) from safety-
sensitive duties in implementing subsection (c) of this section. 
 
42 U.S.C. §12113(c). 
 
192 Illegal drug users face different problems under the ADA.  For example in Salley v. 
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977 (3d Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was fired for 
misconduct relating to his drug use.  He was determined to be a current user of illegal 
drugs at the time of his discharge.  While he was treatment for the drug use, he gave the 
company a written statement regarding his drug use.  The company fired him when it 
learned in the statement that he had used illegal drugs.  The court said that the company 
could fire him for drug-related conduct, and that his participation in the treatment 
program did not protect him because he was an illegal drug user at the time of the 
misconduct.  The court noted that “current user” includes people whose abstinence is 
longer than the plaintiff’s three weeks.  The court cited cases that the plaintiff is a current 
user even if abstinent for one year.  160 F.3d at 980 n.2. 
 
In Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was the 
president of the company and was terminated for misconduct.  He alleged that he was 
erroneously perceived as being addicted to legal drugs.  162 F.3d at 606.  The Board of 
Directors told him that they thought he had a drug problem and that he was going into 
homes to steal drugs.  He was evaluated and was determined to be a drug addict.  The 
Board discharged him for trespassing into private homes.  The court said that the mere 
status of being an illegal drug user may be protected, but the protection is not extended to 
one currently using drugs.  If an addict has used drugs in the weeks or months prior to his 
discharge, he is a current user and not protected unless he has successfully completed a 
drug rehabilitation program and or is participating in such a program and is no longer 
using illegal drugs or if he is erroneously regarded as using illegal drugs.  162 F.3d at 
609-610.  However, being erroneously regarded as using illegal drugs is only considered 
a disability if it substantially limits a major life activity.  162 F.3d at 611.  The plaintiff 
failed to produce evidence of anyone perceiving him as being limited in a major life 
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activity.  The plaintiff’s contention is that the company thought his alleged drug use was 
severe enough to prevent his being able to perform his duties as company president.  The 
court said that this is insufficient to render him substantially limited in his ability to work 
because it is only one job and not a range of jobs.  162 F.3d at 611-12.  In any event, he 
was not discharged because of his perceived addiction, but because of his unexplained 
trespass into peoples’ houses.  162 F.3d at 612.  It was clear, the court said, that he was 
discharged for his misconduct and not because the company thought he was a drug 
addict.  162 F.3d at 613. 
 
In Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd., 176 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 1999), the plaintiff 
pharmacist was fired after he went into treatment for drug addiction.  First, the court said 
that the plaintiff was a current user of illegal drugs because he was informed of the 
decision to fire him five weeks after he went into treatment, citing cases that held that six 
weeks (citing McDaniel v. Baptist Medical Center, 877 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1995)); 
and three weeks (citing Shafer v. Preston Memorial Hospital Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 278 
(4th Cir. 1997)) amounted to current use.  176 F.3d at 856-57.  He was not entitled to the 
protection of the safe harbor provision because he had not completed a treatment program 
and had not been drug-free for a significant period of time.  176 F.3d at 857.  
Furthermore, he was not qualified to perform his job because his drug addiction would 
undermine the integrity of the hospital pharmacy.  The hospital was entitled to consider 
the relapse rate for cocaine users, which is high, in its assessment of whether he was 
qualified.  176 F.3d at 858.  As an alternative ground, the court said that he was not 
disabled under the ADA in any event.  The plaintiff argued that he was regarded as a drug 
addict.  The court said that he had to show that he regarded as being substantially limited 
in a major life activity.  The only available major life activity was working, and he could 
only show that employer believed that he could not be a pharmacist.  The court said that a 
broad range of jobs was required, not just the inability to perform in the his desired field, 
citing similar cases:  Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471 (1998) (plaintiff could not 
work as Addiction Technician because of her seizure disorder); Bridges, 92 F.3d at 335 
(plaintiff’s hemophilia prevented him from performing as a firefighter).  176 F.3d at 860.  
193 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2000).  See supra note 71 for the full text of this provision. 
194 As discussed earlier, in Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003), the Court said 
that the plaintiff did not show that the employer’s reason for refusing to rehire him, that 
he had engaged in misconduct, was a pretext.  540 U.S. at 53-54.   
195 Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988).  See discussion infra notes 199-204. 
196 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
197 392 U.S. at 528.   
198 See supra Section II.  Commenting on the disease concept of alcoholism, the Court 
noted:   
[T]he inescapable fact is that there is no agreement among members of the 
medical profession about what it means to say that “alcoholism” is a 
“disease.” One of the principal works in this field states that the major 
difficulty in articulating a “disease concept of alcoholism” is that 
“alcoholism has too many definitions and disease has practically none.” 
[footnote omitted] This same author concludes that “a disease is what the 
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medical profession recognizes as such.” [footnotes omitted] In other 
words, there is widespread agreement today that “alcoholism” is a 
“disease,” for the simple reason that the medical profession has concluded 
that it should attempt to treat those who have drinking problems. There the 
agreement ends. Debate rages within the medical profession as to whether 
“alcoholism” is a separate “disease” in any meaningful biochemical, 
physiological or psychological sense, or whether it represents one peculiar 
manifestation in some individuals of underlying psychiatric disorders. 
[footnote omitted].   
392 U.S. at 522. 
199 485 U.S. 535 (1988). 
200 485 U.S. at 550. 
201 Id.
202 485 U.S. at 551. 
203 See, e.g., Duda v. Board of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054, 1059 n.10 (7th Cir. 1998) (assuming 
alcoholism is a disability).   
 
In Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748 (1st Cir. 1995), the court said it is well settled that 
alcoholism is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.  Id. at 752 (citing Cook v. Dept of 
Mental Health, 10 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 1993); Little v. FBI 1 F. 3d 255, 257 (4th Cir. 
1993);  Fuller v. Frank, 916 F. 2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 
246 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001).  See also Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 
F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995) (assuming without deciding that alcoholism is a disability 
under the Rehabilitation Act). 
204 In Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment 
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the court said “it is well-established that 
alcoholism meets the definition of a disability.”  Id. at 1105.   
 
In Renaud v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services, 203 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 2000) in which 
the court held that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, 
the court noted that  
Our determination that alcoholism is a disability under the Rehabilitation 
Act may be relevant to a determination of whether alcoholism is a 
disability under the ADA. [citation omitted] "Congress adopted the 
definition of [the] term ['disability'] from the  
Rehabilitation Act definition of the term 'individual with handicaps.' By so 
doing, Congress intended that the relevant caselaw developed under the 
Rehabilitation Act be generally applicable to the term 'disability' as used in 
the ADA." [citation omitted] 
 
Several circuits have held that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA. 
See, e.g., Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1180 (6th Cir.1997); 
Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 127 F.3d 270, 273 (2d 
Cir.1997), vacated en banc on other grounds, 155 F.3d 150 (2d Cir.1998); 
Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d 820, 823 n. 5 (8th 
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Cir.1997); Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair 
Employment Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1105 (Fed.Cir.1996); cf. Despears v. 
Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 635 (7th Cir.1995) (noting that the 
parties did not deny that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA). 
Whether alcoholism is a disability per se may raise additional issues. See 
Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316-17 (5th Cir.1997) (holding 
that alcoholism is not a per se disability under the ADA and evidence that 
alcoholics, in general, are impaired is inadequate to show the substantial 
limitation of one or more major life activities), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
1084, 118 S.Ct. 871, 139 L.Ed.2d 768 (1998); see also Wallin v. 
Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, 153 F.3d  
681, 686 n. 4 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Burch and requiring that a plaintiff 
show impairment of a major life activity), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1004, 119 
S.Ct. 1141, 143 L.Ed.2d 209 (1999); Buckley, 127 F.3d at 274 (citing 
Burch and requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate both "that he was actually 
addicted ... and that this addiction substantially limited one or more of his 
major life activities"). 
 
203 F.3d. at 730 n.2 and n3. 
 
205 127 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 1997). 
206 See supra Section III. B..
207 127 F.3d at 273.   
The reports also make clear that "[i]n removing protection for persons who 
currently use illegal drugs, the Committee does not intend to affect 
coverage for individuals who have a past drug problem or are erroneously 
perceived as having a current drug problem." [citation omitted] Finally, 
the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission's Americans With 
Disabilities Act, Title I Technical Assistance Manual ("EEOC Manual") 
states that "[p]ersons addicted to drugs, but who are no longer using drugs 
illegally and are receiving treatment for drug addiction or who have been 
rehabilitated successfully, are protected by the ADA from discrimination 
on the basis of past drug addiction. [citation omitted].” 
Id. 
208 127 F.3d at 274. 
209 127 F.3d at 274-75. 
210 See supra Section IV.B.1. 
211 Again, alcoholism is just an example, the ADA does not function as it should with 
regard to many impairments, previously considered to be per se disabilities.  See,e.g., 
cases cited infra note 239; Olsky, supra note 31. 
212 See, e.g., Nelson v. Williams Field Services Co., 216 F.3d 1088 (Table), 2000 WL 
743684 (10th Cir. 2000) (Unpublished). 
213 See Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice:  How 
Individualizing the Determination of ‘Disability’ Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV.
327 (1997). 
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214 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997). 
215 119 F.3d at 315. 
216 Id. at 316 n.9. 
217 See, e.g., Nauseda v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., 2003 WL 1873519 (N.D. Ill. 
2003)(in which the court said that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in such major 
life activities as sleeping and communicating.) 
218 See supra discussion accompanying notes 112-17. 
219 29 CFR 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2006). 
220 Indeed the Supreme Court has indicated such, in its determination that reproduction is 
a major life activity.  See Bryan P. Stephenson, I’m So Lonesome I Could Cry. . . .But 
Could I Sue? Whether Interacting with Others Is a Major Life Activity Under the ADA, 
31 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 2004 for a discussion of various life activities the courts have held 
to be major or not. 
221 29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2006). 
222 Id. 
223 306 F. 3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002). 
224 Id. at 1164-65. 
225 Id. at 1167 n.4. 
226 Id. at 1167-68. 
227 Id. at 1168 (quoting EEOC guidelines). 
228 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
229 Bailey, 229 F.3d. at 1168 n.5. 
230 Id. at 1168 (citing the EEOC guidelines). 
231 Id. at 1169. 
232 25 Fed. Appx. 403 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished).   
233 The plaintiff was concerned that all this would cause him to relapse into active 
alcoholism.  Id. at 403.  He was excused from overtime and allowed to work no more 
than eight hours a day.  When the employer required that he work more than eight hours a 
day, he filed a complaint.  Id. at 405.   
234 Id. at 407.  He was unable to show that he was substantially limited in working 
because he did not make this showing with regard to a broad range of jobs.  Id. Finally, 
he testified that taking an antidepressant had pretty much solved his problems, so since 
mitigating measures must be considered in determining whether one if disabled, he was 
not. Id. 
235 Id. 
236 2002 WL  1285065 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (unpublished). 
237 2002 WL at *4 (citing Solieau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 37 (D. Me. 
1996); cf. Rowles v. Automated Production Systems, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D. Pa. 
2000) in which life style changes were sufficient to be substantially limiting.   
238 2002 WL at *4.  The plaintiff also contended that the court ignored evidence that it 
said was not presented.  That his recovery support groups required his absence from his 
family for 4-5 hours a day in early recovery.  Added to his work requirement, this left no 
time for his family.  He also alleged that he had no time to form friendships.  The plaintiff 
also alleged substantial limitation in ability to care for himself because he has to limit his 
intake of food to food that does not contain alcohol.  He also contended that he was 
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substantially limited in his ability to reproduce for fear of passing on the disease.  Even if 
there were a genetic link which the plaintiff did not prove, the plaintiff did not present 
sufficient evidence that he is not substantially limited in reproduction.  2002 WL at *13.  
The plaintiff had two children born after he established his pattern of alcohol abuse.  In 
any event, the court said, the decision not to reproduce cannot turn on personal choice.  
2002 WL at *15.   
239 Since the Court’s restrictive interpretation of disability, all plaintiffs have had 
problems proving that they were substantially limited in a major life activity.  For 
example, in Waldrip v. General Electric Co., 325 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2003), the plaintiff 
had chronic pancreatitis and was allegedly fired when his employer saw the warning on 
his medication that he should not work around heavy machinery when taking it.  The 
court said that he did not prove he was disabled.  The plaintiff said that the disorder, 
which can cause bleeding, tissue death and even pancreatic cancer, substantially limits his 
ability to eat and digest.  The court was willing to concede that eating is a major life 
activity, but that the plaintiff did not produce evidence that he was substantially limited in 
his ability to eat.  652 F.3d at 654-55.  The court then cited other similar cases in which it 
had found that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in a major life activity.   
 The court cited the following cases in which plaintiffs were not substantially 
limited in their ability to work, beginning with cancer and its treatment not limiting the 
ability to work.  Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996).  In 
addition, the court added the following:  
 
See, e.g., Blanks v. Southwestern Bell Communications, Inc., 310 F.3d 
398, 401 (5th Cir.2002) (holding HIV not a substantial limit on major life 
activity of reproduction); Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., Inc., 
242 F.3d 610, 614 (5th Cir.2001) (holding back injury not a substantial 
limit on major life activities of sitting, standing, or working); Talk, 165
F.3d at 1025 (holding deformed leg not a substantial limit on major life 
activities of walking or working); Still, 120 F.3d at 52 (holding monocular 
vision not a substantial limit on major life activity of working); Robinson 
v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir.1996) (holding 
asbestosis not a substantial limit on major life activity of breathing); 
Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 727 (holding permanent arm injury not a substantial 
limit on major life activity of working). 
 
Id. at 656 n5.   
 
It is little wonder that defendants are currently winning 90% of the cases.  Colker, 
Winning and Losing, supra note 5, at 240.. 
240 See Mayerson supra note 43, at 592.  See Thomas Simmons, Working With the ADA’s 
“Regarded as” Definition of a Disability, 5 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 27 (2000) for a good 
discussion of the origin and interpretation of the “regarded as” prong. 
241 Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
242 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. 
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243 The EEOC took these regulations directly from the regulations issued by HEW under 
the Rehabilitation Act.  See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 434-35. The Supreme Court has 
recognized the authority of the regulations issued by HEW.  Id.  
244 See  ????? for a discussion of this omission, in which the author asserts that Congress 
intended for the “regarded as” prong to be interpreted expansively.   
245 Id. 
246 See Eichhorn, supra note 156, at 1432-33. 
247 See Burgdorf supra note 15, at 435. 
248 See Mayerson, supra note 43, at 591. 
249 306 F. 3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002). 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 223-31. 
251 Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1169. 
252 See supra text accompanying note 111 for a discussion of Sutton in this regard. 
253 Id.  Similarly, in Burch v. Coca Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305 (1997), also discussed above, 
the plaintiff alternatively argued that he was “regarded as disabled.”  The court said 
“‘One is regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment if the individual (1)  has 
an impairment which is not substantially limiting but which the employer perceives as 
constituting a substantially limiting impairment; (2) has an impairment which is 
substantially limiting only because of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; 
or (3)  has no impairment at all but is regarded by the employer as having a substantially 
limiting impairment.’”  Id. at 322 (citing Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (5th 
Cir. 1996)).  There was no evidence that the employer regarded him as substantially 
limited in a broad range of jobs, as required.  While the employer may have been 
concerned about his inappropriate behavior, there was no evidence that this was regarded 
as substantially limiting.  In addition, there was no evidence that the employer discredited 
letters from his doctors that he would be able to refrain from such behavior.  However, 
even if the employer regarded his alcoholism as an impediment, there was no showing 
that the employer regarded him as significantly limited in his ability to perform an entire 
class of jobs, just his job as an area service manager with responsibility for 20 employees.  
Id. at 322-23. 
254 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998). 
255 162 F.3d at 606.  The Board of Directors told him that they thought he had a drug 
problem and that he was going into homes to steal drugs.  He was evaluated and was 
determined to be a drug addict.  The Board discharged him for trespassing into private 
homes. 
256 162 F.3d at 611. 
257 162 F.3d at 611-12.  In any event, he was not discharged because of his perceived 
addiction, but because of his unexplained trespass into peoples’ houses.  162 F.3d at 612.  
It was clear that he was discharged for his misconduct and not because the company 
thought he was a drug addict.  162 F.3d at 613. 
258 358 F.3d at 118 n.4.  (citing McGowan, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 27, 123 (2000);  Center and 
Imparato, 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 321, 328 (2003)). 
259 29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2006), which provides that: 
 
(3)  With respect to the major life activity of working— 
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(i)  The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the 
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various 
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, 
skills and abilities. 
The ability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a 
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working:  
(ii)  In addition to the factors listed in paragraph (j)(2) of this section, the 
following factors may be considered in determining whether an individual 
is substantially limited in the major life activity of “working”: 
(A)  The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;  
(B)  The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an 
impairment and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, 
knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which 
the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of 
jobs); 
and/or 
(C)  The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an 
impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar 
training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from 
which the individual is also disqualified because of that impairment (broad 
range of jobs in various classes). 
260 Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
261 See Burgdorf supra note 15, at 454 (citing Equal Employment Opportunities for 
Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,728 (1991). 
262 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. § 1630, app. A 1630.2 (j). 
263 182 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 1999) 1999 WL 435169 (unpublished). 
264 1999 WL 435169 *1. 
265 Id. at *7. 
266 Id. at *8.  (citing Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 567 (7th Cir. 1992); Forrisi v. 
Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986)). 
267 Id. at *8.  (The court ultimately held that the plaintiff was a direct threat to safety and 
thus unqualified).   
In Avery v. Omaha Public Power District, 187 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 1999), the court 
said that after Sutton, to prove that he is regarded as disabled, the plaintiff must show 
more than that the employer regarded him as an alcoholic and a security risk so that he 
could not do a range of security sensitive jobs.  The plaintiff would have to show the 
number and types of jobs the employer thought he would be unable to perform.  Id. at *1-
2. 
268 176 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 1999).   
 Similarly, in Overstreet v. Calvert County Health Dept., 187 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. 
Md. 2002), the defendant argued that being an addiction counselor is not a broad enough 
range of jobs to qualify the plaintiff as regarded as disabled.  The court did not reach this 
issue because it held that the plaintiff was not constructively discharged.  It did bring up 
the interesting question of whether she qualified to be an addiction counselor if she was 
still drinking.   
90
269 Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471 (1998)(plaintiff could not work as Addiction 
Technician because of her seizure disorder); Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 335 
(plaintiff’s hemophilia prevented him from performing as a firefighter).  Zenor, 176 F.3d 
at 860. 
270 Justin S. Gilbert, Prior History, Present Discrimination, and the ADA’s “Record of” 
Disability, 31 U. OF MEMPHIS L. REV. 659, 661 (2001). 
271 Id. at 661-62.    
272 306 F. 3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002). 
273 Id. at 1169. 
274 119 F.3d 305 (1997). 
275 See supra discussion accompanying notes  .
276 Id. at 317. 
277 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
278 Id. at 281. 
279 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
280Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, 358 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2004).  
281 358 F.3d at 115. 
282 See, e.g., Altman v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 100 F.3d 1054 
(2dCir. 1996) (the court held that the plaintiff was not qualified to serve as Chief of 
Medicine because of his inability to stay sober and his conduct that endangered patients 
and the hospital when he was drinking). 
283 See, e.g., Smith v. Davis, 248 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2001) (An employee who does come 
to work on a regular basis is “not qualified” even if caused by his alcoholism, and the 
employer is not required to accommodate his excessive absenteeim.); Leary v. Dalton, 58 
F.3d 748 (1st Cir. 1995);  
284 Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748. 
285 Id. at 753. 
286 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(2000).  See supra note 29 for text of section.   
287 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, 358 F.3d 110, 115-116 (1st Cir. 2004). 
288 See, e.g., Leary, 58 F.3d at 753. 
289 See, e.g., Renaud v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services, 203 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 
2000), in which the court said that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act, but firing for misconduct is not firing for disability. 
290 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991) 
291 951  F.2d. at 516. 
292 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995). 
293 See, e.g., Pernice v. Chicago, 237 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2001) (court cited the virtual 
unanimity of the circuits on the issue that employers are allowed to fire employees for 
misconduct, even if it is related to their disability.); Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 
229 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2000)(court held that defendant fired plaintiff not because it 
perceived her as an alcoholic but because she was under the influence of alcohol on the 
job, for which any employee would be fired); Adamczyk v. Chief of Police of Baltimore 
County, 134 F.3d 362 (4th Cir. 1998) (Plaintiff could be fired for egregious conduct, even 
if related to alcoholism.); Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998), 
(plaintiff company president was ousted for misconduct.  The Board of Directors told him 
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that they thought he had a drug problem and that he was going into homes to steal drugs.  
He was evaluated and was determined to be a drug addict.  The Board discharged him for 
trespassing into private homes); Burch v. Coca Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997), 
(the court cited a number of other cases in which firing for misconduct is not firing for 
alcoholism.  Id. at 319 n.14); Walker v. Consolidated Biscuit Co., 11 F.3d 1481 (6th Cir. 
1997) (employee fired for being under the influence of alcohol at work, not because he 
was an alcoholic.);  Williams v. Widnall, 79 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 1996) (employee fired 
for making threats against other employees while in treatment for alcoholism.); Leary v. 
Dalton, 58 F.3d 748 (1st Cir. 1995), (the court said that alcoholism is a disability under 
the Rehabilitation Act, but that the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of 
the job.  One of the functions of the job was showing up to work as scheduled.  Because 
the plaintiff was in jail for driving while intoxicated, he could show up for work.  He was 
terminated for excessive unauthorized absence.). 
294 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
295 42 U.S.C. §12114 (c) (2000). 
296 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998) 
297 162 F.3d at 608-09. 
298 See, e.g., Pernice v. Chicago, 237 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2001).
299 See, e.g., Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F. 3d 662 (7th Cir. 2000).  In this 
case, the plaintiff was a physician in the defendant’s hospital.  Based on reports that 
employees had smelled alcohol on the plaintiff’s breath, she had been evaluated as having 
a possible alcohol problem.  She submitted to drug testing for a year and was allowed to 
resume social drinking.  Shortly thereafter there were reports that she smelled of alcohol.  
She agreed to resume drug testing, but the hospital declined and required her to go into 
treatment.  When she refused, they fired her.  The plaintiff contended that she had been 
fired because she was perceived as an alcoholic.  The hospital contended that she was 
fired for being under the influence of alcohol on the job which endangered her patients, 
not because she was perceived as an alcoholic.  However, the person who carried out the 
actual termination admitted that he fired the plaintiff because he believed that she was an 
alcoholic and refused treatment.  She was also fired  because she presented a safety risk 
to her patients and a business risk to the hospital because patients would not want to see a 
physician who smelled of alcohol.  229 F.3d at 666.   
300 See, e.g., Fogle v. Ispat Inland, Inc., 32 Fed. Appx. 155 (7th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff fired 
for excessive absenteeism, not drug addiction); Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 
1182 (9th Cir. 2001) (Plaintiff was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants 
and required to participate in a treatment program.  Her employer fired her for her 
absence during the treatment program.  The court said that she could be held to the same 
performance standards as other employees.). 
301 See, e.g., Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995) (decision to 
drive is not due to alcoholism but bad conduct, for which the plaintiff was terminated.  
The court said that the plaintiff’s alcoholism was not the sole cause of his drunk driving; 
he had to make a decision to drive while drunk.)   
302 See, e.g., Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2001) (Plaintiff was 
convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants and required to participate in a 
treatment program.  Her employer fired her for her absence during the treatment program.  
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The court said that she could be held to the same performance standards as other 
employees.); Arbogast v. Alcoa Building Products, 165 F.3d 31 (7th Cir. 1998) (Plaintiff, 
unable to attend training classes because he had lost his drivers license after his third 
DUI, asked for transportation as a reasonable accommodation, which was refused.  The 
court said he was not discriminated against because of his alcoholism, but rather his bad 
behavior and that he could not show that other similarly situated employees were treated 
differently.); Ibarra v. Sunset Scavenger Co., 2003 WL 21244096 (N.D. Cal. 2003) 
(Plaintiff truckdriver was suspended for crashing a company vehicle while driving drunk.  
He was subsequently terminated because he was unable to regain his driver’s license after 
the incident within the six months required under the collective bargaining agreement.  
The court said that the ADA does not require accommodation and expressly authorizes 
employers to hold alcoholic employees to the same standards as other employees.); 
LaBrucherie v. The Regents of the University of California, 1995 U.S.Dist.Lexis 12763 
(N.D. Cal. 1995)(unpublished)(fired for absence from work due to incarceration for 
DUI).  
303 See, e.g., Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 209 F.3d 
931 (6th Cir. 2000) (The plaintiff was not hired as a school driver because of a prior 
incident in which he had been caught drinking on the job.  The court said that whether the 
employer perceived him as an alcoholic or not, it could refuse to hire him because of his 
prior bad conduct.)  Livingstone v. U.S. Postal Service, 168 F.3d 490, 1998 WL 791828 
(6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished).  (Even if plaintiff was dismissed because of his 
intoxication, the fact that he arrived at work unable to perform his duties and threatened 
the safety of others was sufficient to support his discharge.  Even if his misconduct was 
related to alcoholism, he could be legitimately discharged for the misbehavior.  1998 WL 
791828 at **6; Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 304 (9th Cir. 1996) (discharge for firing 
assault rifle in a bar). 
 In a twist on misconduct cases, in Brennan v. New York City Police Dept., 141
F.3d 1151 (Table) 1998 WL 51284 (2nd Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was a policeman, who at 
the time of his alleged forced resignation, was a recovering alcoholic.  However, before 
he got into recovery, he had consumed alcohol and fallen asleep on a public transport.  
When he awoke, he was disoriented and left his gun in a bag on the subway.  It was never 
recovered.  He said that falling asleep was not the result of his consumption of alcohol, 
but because he had worked a long shift.  1998 WL 51284 at *1.  After another incident, 
he went into a treatment program.  After treatment, he was placed on restricted duty and 
later resigned because he was not returned to active duty.  The plaintiff complained that 
he was forced to resign because of his alcoholism.  1998 WL 51284 at *2.  The court said 
that it was not disputed that the plaintiff was protected by the ADA because he was a 
person who had a record of a disability as an alcoholic.  However, the court said that he 
was not otherwise qualified because of his carelessness in losing the gun. Because the 
plaintiff himself said he had not lost the gun as a consequence of his alcoholism, the court 
said that he was not forced to resign because of his alcoholism.  The court further said 
that a reasonable accommodation would be inappropriate because he himself did not 
attribute his carelessness to his disability.  1998 WL 51284 at *3. 
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The current consensus with regard to misconduct related to a disability is 
expressed in Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995), in which the 
plaintiff was discharged for driving under the influence, as follows:  
 
To impose liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the 
Rehabilitation Act in such circumstances would indirectly but 
unmistakably undermine the laws that regulate dangerous behavior. It 
would give alcoholics and other diseased or disabled persons a privilege to 
avoid some of the normal sanctions for criminal activity. It would say to 
an alcoholic: We know it is more difficult for you to avoid committing the 
crime of drunk driving than it is for healthy people, and therefore we will 
lighten the sanction by letting you keep your job in circumstances where 
anyone else who engaged in the same criminal behavior would lose it. 
 
The refusal to excuse, or even alleviate the punishment of, the disabled 
person who commits a crime under the influence as it were of his 
disability yet not compelled by it and so not excused by it in the eyes of 
the criminal law is not "discrimination" against the disabled; it is a refusal 
to discriminate in their favor . It is true that the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act require the employer to make a 
reasonable accommodation of an employee's disability, but we do not 
think it is a reasonably required accommodation to overlook infractions of 
law.  
 
We can imagine a slightly different case in which Despears would stand 
on firmer ground. Suppose when he was hired by the medical facility he 
told his employer, "I dare not drive because of my alcoholism, and 
therefore I ask you to excuse me from having to have a driver's license to 
be a maintenance worker, since driving is not an essential part of the job." 
That would be a request for an accommodation, rather than a request to be 
excused from a consequence of criminal activity. 
 
Id. at 636.  The court said that the decision to drive is not due to alcoholism but bad 
conduct, for which the plaintiff was terminated.  The court said that the plaintiff’s 
alcoholism was not the sole cause of his drunk driving; he had to make a decision to drive 
while drunk. 
304 Id. at 636. 
305 See, e.g., Brohm v. JH Properties, 149 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1998), in which the court 
analogized the plaintiff anesthesiologist’s sleeping during surgical procedures caused by 
sleep apnea to cases in which the plaintiff was fired for misconduct caused by his 
alcoholism.  The court noted that in Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 
511 (2d Cir. 1991), the court said that a termination for excessive absenteeism caused by 
the plaintiff’s alcoholism was discrimination based solely on disability because it was 
based on a factor closely related to the plaintiff’s disability.  The court said it is like a 
plaintiff whose limp causes him to make a thump when he walks, and the employer firing 
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him for making the thumping noise.  951 F.2d. at 516.  However, the court in the instant 
case repudiated that analysis and said that firing someone for misconduct caused by their 
disability is not firing them because of their disability.  The court referred to its decision 
in Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995) in which the court had 
approved the firing of a football coach for driving while intoxicated which the plaintiff 
alleged was causally connected to his alcoholism.  The Sixth Circuit had held there that 
there is a distinction between discharging someone for misconduct and discharging 
someone for his disability.  Otherwise the employer would have to accommodate 
behavior considered unacceptable in other employees because of the plaintiff’s disability.  
In the instant case, the plaintiff had alleviated the effects the sleep apnea and was 
nevertheless fired from the job.  149 F.3d at 522.  See Kelly Cahill Timmons, 
Accommodating Misconduct Under The Americans With Disabilities Act, 57 FLA. L. REV.
187 (2005) for a discussion of misconduct and disabilities other than alcoholism. 
 Similarly in Gasper v. Perry, 155 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 1998), the court said that an 
employer may discharge an employee for misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to 
the plaintiff’s disability.  In this case, the plaintiff had difficulty relating to people 
because of catastrophic injuries received in an accident.  
 In a particularly harsh and inexplicable case, Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison 
Co., 128 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997), the court said that the employer may prefer a non-
disabled employee over a disabled employee who does not perform as well, even if his 
less able performance is due to his disability.  The plaintiff had been out of work because 
of a heart attack, so he was rated low on quantity of work performed.  The court said he 
was not fired because of his disability; he was fired as a consequence of his disability.  
128 F.3d at 1197.   
306 See infra note 308. 
307 216 F.3d 1088 (Table) 2000 WL 743684 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished). 
308 
Numerous courts in other circuits have similarly held that violation of 
return to work agreements or Last Chance Agreements constitute 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating employees. See 
Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1181-85 (6th Cir.1997) 
(employer did not violate the ADA in discharging an alcoholic employee 
who failed to comply with his Last Chance Agreement, which conditioned 
his employment on counseling and periodic testing for substance abuse); 
Hinnershitz v. Ortep of Pa., Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7148, 1998 WL 962096, at 
*6 (E.D.Pa. Dec.22, 1998), aff'd, 203 F.3d 817 (3d Cir.1999) (defendant 
articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's 
discharge where the plaintiff breached his return to work agreement); 
Nanopoulos v. Lukens Steel Co., No. 96 Civ. 6483, 1997 WL 438463, at 
*4 (E.D.Pa. July 29, 1997), aff'd, 156 F.3d 1225 (3d Cir.1998) (where the 
defendant has advanced valid, non-discriminatory reasons for firing the 
plaintiff, namely, his violation of his Last Chance Agreement, no rational 
jury could find discrimination); Golson v. Runyon, 812 F.Supp. 558, 561 
(E.D.Pa.1993) (holding that the plaintiff was fired because she breached 
her Last Chance Agreement, not because she was an alcoholic); Brock v. 
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Lucky Stores, No. 98 Civ. 4758, 2000 WL 288395, at *6 (N.D.Cal. 
Mar.14, 2000), aff'd, 23 Fed. Appx. 709, 2001 WL 1458014 (9th 
Cir.2001) (the plaintiff's failure to strictly comply with a return to work 
agreement was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating the 
plaintiff); Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co., 143 F.Supp.2d 743, 767-68 
(S.D.Tex.2001) (no discrimination where the plaintiff had received an 
opportunity to obtain treatment and subsequently violated a return to work 
agreement); McKey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 956 F.Supp. 1313, 1319 
(S.D.Tex.1997) (the defendants' termination of the plaintiff for failing to 
honor the terms and conditions of his return to work agreement was a 
legitimate reason for termination of his employment). 
 
Mayo v. Columbia University, 2003 WL 1824628 **6 n7 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) 
(unpublished). 
 
309 2000 WL 743684 *2.
310 Id. at *3. 
311 Cite  
312 See Friedland supra note, 166, at 173. 
313 347 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2003) 
314 347 F.3d at 688-89. 
315 2003 WL 1873519. 
316 2003 WL 1873519 at *2-3. 
317 2003 WL 1873519 at *4.  Similarly, in Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180 (6th 
Cir. 1997), the court said that the plaintiff was fired for violating the last chance 
agreement, not for his alcoholism.  He had signed the last chance agreement earlier after 
testing positive for alcohol and going into treatment.  He also agreed to drug tests as a 
condition of being allowed to continue to work.  At the time he tested positive, he was 
not under the influence nor had he used alcohol on the job, which was the prohibited 
conduct.  The court said even though employees not subject to a last chance agreement 
would not have fired, it was permissible to fire the plaintiff for testing positive in 
violation of the last chance agreement.  The last chance agreement was an 
accommodation to the plaintiff rather than firing him earlier.   
 In Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1997), the 
plaintiff was discovered drinking on the job and offered an opportunity to go to 
treatment.  She turned it down and was fired.  The court said that the company perceived 
her as an alcoholic, so she qualified as disabled under the ADA.  In addition, the court 
said that she had raised a genuine issue of material fact that she was fired because the 
company perceived that she was an alcoholic and should go to treatment.  There was no 
proof regarding the validity of the rule that she had violated and that there were other 
employees who drove company vehicles after consuming alcohol.  In addition, the 
company claimed that offering her treatment was a reasonable accommodation.  
However, there was insufficient proof that the plaintiff was an alcoholic and in need of 
accommodation.    
318 See supra discussion accompanying notes 48-49. 
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319 See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reasonable Accommodations for Individuals Regarded 
As Having Disabilitites under the Americans with Diabilities Act?  Why “No” Should Not 
Be the Answer” 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 895, 896-898; Friedland supra note 166, at 186.  
See, e.g., Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999).  “The prevailing 
view in the federal appellate courts is that a ‘regarded as’ plaintiff is not entitled to a 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA.  Friedman & Strickler, supra note 2, at 195 
(supp. 2005). 
320 See id. 
321 See Rosenthal supra note 319, at 899.  The author cites other reasons why reasonable 
accommodation should apply to all three prongs of disability definition, including “the 
remedial purposes behind the ADA, furtherance of some of the ADA’s most important 
goals, the idea that employers should not benefit by creating and following stereotypes 
the ADA was meant to eliminate, the Supreme Court’s decision in School Board of 
Nassau County v. Arline, [citation omitted], and the legislative history behind the 
‘regarded as’ prong of the ADA.”  Id. at 959-60.  The author also discusses the arguments 
against applying reasonable accommodation to situations in which the plaintiff does not 
have an actual disability.  Id. at 905-19. 
322 See generally id. at 962-63.  As the author notes if the employee has no impairment, 
then he does not need a reasonable accommodation.  If, however, he has an impairment 
and needs a reasaonable accommodation to perform the job, the ADA’s plain language 
and remedial purposes require that he should have it.  Id. at 966-67. 
323 LaBrucherie v. Regents of the University of California, 119 F.3d 6, 1997 WL 398689 
at**1 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.3d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990). 
324 In Turner v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 173 F.3d 430, 1999 WL 68580 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(unpublished), the court said that the plaintiff had been offered a reasonable 
accommodation and could not hold out for the accommodation he preferred.  The 
employer may chose the cheaper of two effective accommodations. 
325 See infra Section IV.B.2.b.2). 
326 See supra notes 203-04. 
327 See, e.g., Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment 
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (the court said “it is well-established that 
alcoholism meets the definition of a disability.”  Id. at 1105.  The question was whether 
the defendant was required to offer the plaintiff a “fresh start” as a reasonable 
accommodation and that his pre-treatment discipline would be rescinded.  The court said 
that offering the plaintiff a leave to go to treatment and light duty afterwards was a 
sufficient accommodation; that the defendant can chose the less expensive or easier to 
implement between two reasonable accommodations that are effective.  95 F. 3d at 1107. 
328 See, e.g. Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 1995). 
329 133 F.3d 137 (1st Cir. 1998).  See In Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 1990), the 
court said that continued accommodation for an alcoholic would just enable him to drink.  
The plaintiff had received at least three leaves for treatment before he was discharged, 
and this was sufficient reasonable accommodation. 
330 133 F. 3d at  (citing Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 134 (D.D.C. 1986). 
331 133 F.3d at (citing Schmidt v Safeway, 864 F. Supp. 991 (D. Or. 1994). 
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332 133 F.3d at (citing Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F. 2d 869, 879 n.10 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
333 See Smith v. Davis, 248 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2001) (employer not required to 
accommodate employee’s excessive absenteeism because he is an alcoholic.).  See supra 
cases cited in text accompanying notes    (other bad conduct cases).  
334 Alcoholics are not without some recourse, if the employer is covered by the Family 
and Medical Leave Act, the alcoholic can get unpaid leave to go to treatment. 29 USCS § 
2612 (2000)  See, e.g., Sloop v. ABTCO, Inc., 178 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1999) (FMLA 
requires a leave of absence for treatment of substance abuse, but not if the leave is 
occasioned by the plaintiff’s continuing to drink rather than go to treatment.) 
335 See generally Starr supra note 55, at 2327-29. 
336 Id.   
337 See supra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
338 See infra Section IV.B.2.a.1). 
339 As discussed later, he might be determined to have a record of a disability or be 
regarded as disabled, but he probably would not be entitled to reasonable accommodation 
under either of these provisions.  See infra Section IV.B.2.c. 
340 Because this is an individualized inquiry, some alcoholics could be limited in major 
life activities because of physical consequences of the drinking, such as heart disease, but 
this would be an impairment in and of itself. 
341 See supra text accompanying notes 149-50. 
342 See supra text accompanying notes 272-76.
343 See supra text accompanying notes  112-17. 
344 Bagenstros, supra note 26, at 448. 
345 See supra section IV.B.2.c. 
346 See supra note 239 for cases involving other impairments that courts have determined 
are not disabilities.  See Eichhorn supra note 106, at 203-15 for cases applying 
“substantially limited” to hold that persons who are blind in one eye, missing fingers, and 
had an arm amputated are not disabled. 
347 See Edmonds, supra note 151, at 325.  The author discussed other life activities that 
should be added to the list, such as driving, digesting food, eliminating waste products, or 
exercising. 
348 The courts have been very restrictive in their interpretation of the ADA in other areas 
relating to alcoholism as well.  For example, in EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F3d 871 (5th 
Cir. 2000), in response to the Exxon Valdes accident in which an alcoholic employee 
caused a serious accident, the company implemented a policy that removes employees 
who have undergone treatment for substance abuse from certain safety sensitive little-
supervised positions.  In response to the policy, the company demoted employees who 
had been in recovery for decades, among others.  The EEOC alleged that the qualification 
standard has a disparate impact on persons with the disability of addiction.  The company 
justified the policy promoting safety in jobs where the employees’ potential relapse is not 
monitored, as well as furthering environmental protection and prevention of tort liability 
and good corporate citizenship.  The EEOC moved for summary judgment to require 
Exxon to defend the policy by showing direct threat rather than business necessity.  The 
EEOC contended that all safety-based qualifications must be defended under the direct 
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threat provision of the statute.  The court disagreed, holding that the direct threat 
provision is for application to individuals who may pose a direct threat and not for 
policies that deal with general safety requirements.  203 F.3d at 873-74.  The court 
further noted that in order to determine whether the policy is justified by business 
necessity, “the court should thus consider the magnitude of a failure in assessing whether 
the rate of recidivism among recovering substance abusers constitutes a safety risk 
sufficient for business necessity.”  203 F.3d at 875.  “In short, the probability of the 
occurrence of discounted by the magnitude of its consequences.”  Id. 
349 See Bagenstros supra note 4, at 944; Harold S. Lewis, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 1
(1992). See also, Jeb Rubenfield, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 
1141 (2002). For a more optimistic view of the Supreme Court’s attitude toward Title 
VII, see Harold S. Lewis, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1081 (2005), in which the author opines 
that the Supreme Court is interpreting Title VII more broadly after the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act after years of unfavorable interpretations.  However, Some authors have opined that 
the Court is treating the ADA even less favorably than other anti-discrimination acts.  See 
Bagenstros, supra note 4, at 944.  Compare Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 5 (in 
which the author concludes that defendants are winning 90% of the time in employment 
cases) with Waterstone, supra note 13, at 1826-32 (in which the author shows that 
plaintiffs are doing substantially better in non-employment cases.  The author concludes 
that courts are more troubled by opening up employment opportunities to disabled people 
than they are by opening public accommodations to disabled people.).  Plaintiffs have 
been more successful in the Supreme Court in non-employment cases.  See id at 1838-
1842.  “[I]n nearly every Title II and III case before it, the Supreme Court has expanded 
rather than narrowed the ADA.   
350 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).  See Eichhorn, supra note 156, at 1427. 
351 See, e.g. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
351 See Sutton, 527 U.S. 471.  As noted, the Supreme Court has noted this reluctance, 
despite the fact the working was found to be a major life activity in Arline and cited as 
such in the HEW regulations.  Congress clearly intended Arline’s view of disability to 
govern the ADA.  See Rahdert supra note 105, at 321-29.   
352 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
353 See supra Sections III.B.1.a. and text accompanying notes 171-177.) 
354 See Kaiser, supra note 5, at 753-54.  Another reason for the treatment the Court has 
accorded Title I of the ADA has been posited, and that is that the Court believes the 
disability discrimination may be defended as rational, while other forms of discrimination 
may not be.  See Bagenstros, supra note 4. Cf. Anderson, supra note 25, at 119 (Critics of 
the ADA view it as “in effect work[ing] as a subsidy paid by employers through 
‘reasonable accommodation,’ a subsidy likely to be borne disparately within the labor 
market.” Id. at 119-20.) 
355 Congress was concerned about the high unemployment rate among the disabled, 
which according to one survey was 39%.  See Olsky, supra note 31, at 1841. 
356 Other authors have reached the same conclusion.  See Colker, A Windfall for 
Defendants, supra note 5, at 160.  In addition, the definition of disability that was 
borrowed from the Rehabilitation Act was for the purpose of limiting persons as whom 
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the employer would have to take affirmative action.  See Waterstone supra note 13, at 
1849; Friedland supra note 166, at 183-84 (citing Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 432.  
357 See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference;  Can 
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act? 79 
N. C. L. REV. 307 (2001) in which the author explores the re-distributive nature of the 
ADA. “The ‘unfunded mandate’ quality of the obligation was magnified by the 
undefined scope of the ensuing responsibility to accommodate.”  Id. at 317-318.  “[U]ntil 
Congress confronts the disjunction of fitting a statute with such wealth-redistributive 
aspects into a context of ‘but for,’ Title VII-like discrimination . . . the Court’s narrowing 
of the definition of ‘disabled’ may prove the easiest and most effective way for the Court 
to limit the seemingly unfathomable potential sweep of ADA claims.”  Id. at 357-58; 
Long, supra note 55, at 622.   
Another author suggests another possible impetus for limiting the protected class, 
citing the large number of disability claims filed.  Stephen F. Beforr, The Story of Sutton 
v. United Air Lines, Inc.:  Narrowing the Reach of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 329, 332-33 (2006 Joel Friedman, editor).  
358 Other authors share the same view.  See Colker, A Windfall for Defendants, supra note 
5, at 161.  See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 357 for a discussion regarding the re-
distributive nature of the ADA. “The ‘unfunded mandate’ quality of the obligation was 
magnified by the undefined scope of the ensuing responsibility to accommodate.”  Id. at 
317-318. 
359 See supra  text accompanying notes 64-65. 
360 Section 504 does not require federal grantors to take affirmative action, see Burgdorf, 
supra note 15, at 418-19, and the ADA was based on this provision of the Rehabilitation 
Act.  Id. at 476. 
361 See Friedland supra note, 166, at 184-86; Burgdorf supra note 15, at 432-33.  
362 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). 
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